Ghana’s push to place strategic natural resources in local hands risks becoming a costly illusion unless the government moves beyond nationalistic rhetoric to build clear, methodical execution frameworks, according to Bright Simons, Vice President of the policy think tank IMANI Africa.
Speaking during a recent webinar examining the Bogoso-Prestea Gold Mine, Simons argued that what Ghana has developed is a sophisticated capacity for articulating bold economic visions while consistently failing to translate them into the sequenced, disciplined policy steps needed to deliver real control over national assets.
“We are big on the big vision. We want local ownership of mines, but when it comes to the policy dynamics of how you actually attain it, which requires systematic and methodical planning, then we lose sight,” he said.
He framed the problem as what he calls a “Katanomics” approach to economic governance, characterised by aggregating inspiring goals while neglecting the disaggregated execution required to achieve them. The result, he argued, is a recurring gap between proclaimed ownership and actual control, where local names appear on licenses and company registrations while the real levers of decision-making and value capture remain in foreign hands.
The Bogoso-Prestea situation, he said, is a clear illustration. Heath Goldfields, a Ghanaian-owned company, took over the mine as part of the government’s indigenisation drive and poured first gold in February 2026 after a two-year shutdown. But the terms of the US$65 million prepayment and offtake agreement signed with Singapore-based commodities trader Trafigura on April 2, 2026, raise serious questions about the depth of that ownership. Under the deal, Heath Goldfields has granted Trafigura a first-ranking fixed and floating charge over virtually all its assets, including bank accounts, processing equipment, revenues, and the mining leases themselves, in exchange for financing repayable in 700,000 ounces of gold, worth approximately US$2.3 billion at current prices. The agreement also reportedly restricts Heath from developing the sulphide ore processing plant essential to the mine’s long-term productivity and limits additional borrowing.
“The way it’s been structured is such that it protects Trafigura in every scenario, and it suggests that they have little confidence in the Ghanaian jurisdiction, because of the demands they are making,” Simons said. “It’s as if they really expect the jurisdiction to mess up.”
For Simons, the stringency of those conditions does not merely reflect one company’s risk assessment. It signals a broader regulatory credibility problem. When a sophisticated global commodities trader demands that level of protection before committing capital, he argues, it implies that the state’s own vetting of Heath Goldfields’ technical and financial capacity was insufficient.
He said the same pattern is visible elsewhere. Disputes surrounding Adamus Resources Limited and the handling of Springfield Exploration and Production, he argued, reflect a consistent failure of sequencing, where assets are transferred or assigned without ensuring that receiving parties have the managerial, technical, and financial capacity to operate them independently. Each episode of abrupt policy action or inadequate due diligence, he said, adds to an accumulating perception that Ghana’s regulatory rules are fluid and long-term commercial agreements are uncertain.
“We always get trapped in this emotive language and inability to look carefully at detail,” he said. “We aggregate the vision, but we cannot disaggregate the execution pathway, the sequencing, the steps we have to take to achieve real local ownership. And that’s what has happened here.”
Simons stressed that the case for Ghana controlling its natural resources is strong and widely shared. But he warned that without credible policy architecture to back that ambition, the country risks repeating a damaging cycle: celebrating local ownership while the economic benefits flow elsewhere.
