Fending Off Pirates:

The western African states have said clearly they do not have the naval, coast guard or customs resources to deal with the piracy evident in the Gulf of Guinea. Further, they do not say, but it is clear, they do not have the money to do it.

Piracy is now confined to one principal area. But piracy is similar to blood?a little spilled goes a long way. Piracy will spread elsewhere when and if strong emphasis is put on the Gulf of Guinea.

Let us look at the hard facts in this hard business. Here is the seagoing manpower for each state and the vessels available from north to south, as well as their populations and GDPs. Taken together these statements are probably fairly truthful. Third party reports confirm this about uniformed persons and equipment, GDPs and populations.

Morocco: 42,000 uniformed persons, 22 offshore patrol boats, six frigates, one corvette;

Western Sahara: none;Mauritania: 620 uniformed persons, ten patrol and coastal craft;

Senegal: 600 uniformed persons, three flotillas of vessels and craft said to be capable on the high seas as fast coastal patrol and surveillance and naval support;

Gambia: various older Chinese craft and small ships;

Guinea Bissau: none operational;

Guinea: 900 uniformed persons, several small patrol craft;

Even if the western African states could agree to combined operations or even coordinated operations?things not seen heretofore in polarized and politicized Africa ? what is left, other than words to suppress piracy, is sad in the most liberal estimates. Read this and be resigned about western Africa politics.

The craft and ships and persons available have other established missions such as fisheries and customs duties, as well as national security defenses. The coastline from the northern border of Morocco to the southern border of Angola is approximately 4,650 miles?depending on who is measuring. Assuming UNCLOS jurisdictional waters, this area comprises some 2.1 million square miles to mind. This is for some 40 craft and ships. That means each is responsible for an area 54,000 square miles or a box of 735 miles per side. That is neither practicable nor effective. Pirates are not very careful about UNCLOS limits. Pirates are opportunists who operate where naval forces do not operate. Getting caught makes for a bad day for a pirate. The odds are there will be few bad days for pirates in western Africa. One may be challenged or one may retreat from these realities in western Africa.

Remember that the traffic for VLCCs and ULCCs from the Cape of Good Hope to Europe is vulnerable in addition to the container vessels calling west Africa and vice versa for each. Then there are the fishing vessels and the smaller coastal ships and older break- bulk ships and ore carriers. Navigation and protection areas aside, forces otherwise uninformed go where the pirates were last. The barn door is thereby shut firmly after the horse is out.

It is unclear that the western African states have the kinds of surveillance equipment or intelligence capabilities required for the mission to be successful. Those things are expensive, as is the training to use them. Indeed, for many states?not just in western African?they are merely glints in the eyes of their naval commanders.

Then there are small arms however you choose to define them. The customs rules are strict and strictly enforced. Destabilization is always a fear. After all, what would a good coup be without some gunshots?

Looking at the GDPs of the Western Africa states and their demographics, politics and fears, it is clear that they collectively simply cannot afford to have naval, coast guard and customs forces ready and capable of dealing with pirates. The collective will of western

Africa does and will have a great difficulty in putting the common good ahead of state politics. Western Africa needs industrialized state help to deal effectively with these criminals.

The facts do not offer a great deal of hope or assistance from those in the general neighborhood of western African piracy.