Nigeria

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Source: InfoPlease

Nigeria (nījir’ēu) [key], officially Federal Republic of Nigeria, republic (2006 provisional pop. 140,003,542), 356,667 sq mi (923,768 sq km), W Africa. It borders on the Gulf of Guinea (an arm of the Atlantic Ocean) in the south, on Benin in the west, on Niger in the northwest and north, on Chad in the northeast, and on Cameroon in the east. Abuja is the capital and Lagos is the largest city.

Land and People
The Niger River and its tributaries (including the Benue, Kaduna, and Kebbi rivers) drain most of the country. Nigeria has a 500-mile (800-km) coastline, for the most part made up of sandy beaches, behind which lies a belt of mangrove swamps and lagoons that averages 10 mi (16 km) in width but increases to c.60 mi (100 km) wide in the great Niger delta in the east. North of the coastal lowlands is a broad hilly region, with rain forest in the south and savanna in the north. Behind the hills is the great plateau of Nigeria (average elevation 2,000 ft/610 m), a region of plains covered largely with savanna but merging into scrubland in the north. Greater altitudes are attained on the Bauchi and Jos plateaus in the center and in the Adamawa Massif (which continues into Cameroon) in the east, where Nigeria’s highest point (c.6,700 ft/2,040 m) is located.

In addition to Abuja and Lagos, other major cities include Aba, Abeokuta, Ado, Benin, Enugu, Ibadan, Ife, Ilesha, Ilorin, Iwo, Kaduna, Kano, Maiduguri, Mushin, Ogbomosho, Onitsha, Oshogbo, Port Harcourt, and Zaria.

Nigeria is easily the most populous nation in Africa and one of the fastest growing on earth. The inhabitants are divided into about 250 ethnic groups. The largest of these groups are the Hausa and Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast. Other peoples include the Kanuri, Nupe, and Tiv of the north, the Edo of the south, and the Ibibio-Efik and Ijaw of the southeast. English is the official language, and each ethnic group speaks its own language. About half of the population, living mostly in the north, are Muslim; another 40%, living almost exclusively in the south, are Christian; the rest follow traditional beliefs.

Economy
The economy of Nigeria historically was based on agriculture, and about 70% of the workforce is still engaged in farming (largely of a subsistence type). The chief crops are cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, soybeans, cassava, yams, and rubber. In addition, cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs are raised.

Petroleum is the leading mineral produced in Nigeria and provides about 95% of foreign exchange earnings and the majority of government revenues. It is found in the Niger delta and in the bights of Benin and Biafra. Petroleum production on an appreciable scale began in the late 1950s, and by the early 1970s it was by far the leading earner of foreign exchange. The growing oil industry attracted many to urban centers, to the detriment of the agricultural sector. In the 1980s a decline in world oil prices prompted the government to bolster the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, both refinery capacity and agriculture have not kept pace with population growth, forcing the nation to import refined petroleum products and food. Other minerals extracted include tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, columbite, lead, zinc, and gold.

Industry in Nigeria includes the processing of agricultural products and minerals, and the manufacture of textiles, construction materials, footware, chemicals, fertilizer, and steel. Fishing and forestry are also important to the economy, and there is small commercial shipbuilding and repair sector. In addition, traditional woven goods, pottery, metal objects, and carved wood and ivory are produced. Nigeria’s road and rail systems are constructed basically along north-south lines; the country’s chief seaports are Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar.

Except when oil prices are low, Nigeria generally earns more from exports than it spends on imports. Other important exports include cocoa, rubber, and palm products. The main imports are machinery, chemicals, transportation equipment, manufactured goods, food, and live animals. The United States is by far the largest trading partner, followed by China, Brazil, Spain, and Great Britain.

Government
Nigeria is governed under the constitution of 1999. The president, who is both head of state and head of government, is popularly elected for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The bicameral legislature, the National Assembly, consists of the 109-seat Senate and a 360-seat House of Representatives; all legislators are elected by popular vote for four-year terms. Administratively, the country is divided into 36 states and the federal capital territory.

Early History
Little is known of the earliest history of Nigeria. By c.2000 B.C. most of the country was sparsely inhabited by persons who had a rudimentary knowledge of raising domesticated food plants and of herding animals. From c.800 B.C. to c.A.D. 200 the neolithic Nok culture (named for the town where archaeological findings first were made) flourished on the Jos Plateau; the Nok people made fine terra-cotta sculptures and probably knew how to work tin and iron. The first important centralized state to influence Nigeria was Kanem-Bornu, which probably was founded in the 8th cent. A.D., to the north of Lake Chad (outside modern Nigeria). In the 11th cent., by which time its rulers had been converted to Islam, Kanem-Bornu expanded south of Lake Chad into present-day Nigeria, and in the late 15th cent. its capital was moved there.

Beginning in the 11th cent. seven independent Hausa city-states were founded in N Nigeria—Biram, Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Rano, and Zaria. Kano and Katsina competed for the lucrative trans-Saharan trade with Kanem-Bornu, and for a time had to pay tribute to it. In the early 16th cent. all of Hausaland was briefly held by the Songhai Empire. However, in the late 16th cent., Kanem-Bornu replaced Songhai as the leading power in N Nigeria, and the Hausa states regained their autonomy. In southwest Nigeria two states—Oyo and Benin—had developed by the 14th cent.; the rulers of both states traced their origins to Ife, renowned for its naturalistic terra-cotta and brass sculpture. Benin was the leading state in the 15th cent. but began to decline in the 17th cent., and by the 18th cent. Oyo controlled Yorubaland and also Dahomey. The Igbo people in the southeast lived in small village communities.

In the late 15th cent. Portuguese navigators became the first Europeans to visit Nigeria. They soon began to purchase slaves and agricultural produce from coastal middlemen; the slaves had been captured further inland by the middlemen. The Portuguese were followed by British, French, and Dutch traders. Among the Igbo and Ibibio a number of city-states were established by individuals who had become wealthy by engaging in the slave trade; these included Bonny, Owome, and Okrika.

The Nineteenth Century
There were major internal changes in Nigeria in the 19th cent. In 1804, Usuman dan Fodio (1754–1817), a Fulani and a pious Muslim, began a holy war to reform the practice of Islam in the north. He soon conquered the Hausa city-states, but Bornu, led by Muhammad al-Kanemi (also a Muslim reformer) until 1835, maintained its independence. In 1817, Usuman dan Fodio’s son, Muhammad Bello (d.1837) established a state centered at Sokoto, which controlled most of N Nigeria until the coming of the British (1900–1906). Under both Usuman dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello, Muslim culture, and also trade, flourished in the Fulani empire. In Bornu, Muhammad al-Kanemi was succeeded by Umar (reigned 1835–80), under whom the empire disintegrated.

In 1807, Great Britain abandoned the slave trade; however, other countries continued it until about 1875. Meanwhile, many African middlemen turned to selling palm products, which were Nigeria’s chief export by the middle of the century. In 1817 a long series of civil wars began in the Oyo Empire; they lasted until 1893 (when Britain intervened), by which time the empire had disintegrated completely.

In order to stop the slave trade there, Britain annexed Lagos in 1861. In 1879, Sir George Goldie gained control of all the British firms trading on the Niger, and in the 1880s he took over two French companies active there and signed treaties with numerous African leaders. Largely because of Goldie’s efforts, Great Britain was able to claim S Nigeria at the Conference of Berlin (see Berlin, Conference of) held in 1884–85.

In the following years, the British established their rule in SW Nigeria, partly by signing treaties (as in the Lagos hinterland) and partly by using force (as at Benin in 1897). Jaja, a leading African trader based at Opobo in the Niger delta and strongly opposed to European competition, was captured in 1887 and deported. Goldie’s firm, given (1886) a British royal charter, as the Royal Niger Company, to administer the Niger River and N Nigeria, antagonized Europeans and Africans alike by its monopoly of trade on the Niger; in addition, it was not sufficiently powerful to gain effective control over N Nigeria, which was also sought by the French.

Colonialism
In 1900 the Royal Niger Company’s charter was revoked and British forces under Frederick Lugard began to conquer the north, taking Sokoto in 1903. By 1906, Britain controlled Nigeria, which was divided into the Colony (i.e., Lagos) and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In 1914 the two regions were amalgamated and the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria was established.

The administration of Nigeria was based on a system devised by Lugard and called “indirect rule”; under this system, Britain ruled through existing political institutions rather than establishing a wholly new administrative network. In some areas (especially the southeast) new African officials (resembling the traditional rulers in other parts of the country) were set up; in most cases they were not accepted by the mass of the people and were able to rule only because British power stood behind them. All important decisions were made by the British governor, and the African rulers, partly by being associated with the colonialists, soon lost most of their traditional authority. Occasionally (as in Aba in 1929) discontent with colonial rule flared into open protest.

Under the British, railroads and roads were built and the production of cash crops, such as palm nuts and kernels, cocoa, cotton, and peanuts, was encouraged. The country became more urbanized as Lagos, Ibadan, Kano, Onitsha, and other cities grew in size and importance. From 1922, African representatives from Lagos and Calabar were elected to the legislative council of Southern Nigeria; they constituted only a small minority, and Africans otherwise continued to have no role in the higher levels of government. Self-help groups organized on ethnic lines were established in the cities. A small Western-educated elite developed in Lagos and a few other southern cities.

In 1947, Great Britain promulgated a constitution that gave the traditional authorities a greater voice in national affairs. The Western-educated elite was excluded, and, led by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, its members vigorously denounced the constitution. As a result, a new constitution, providing for elected representation on a regional basis, was instituted in 1951.

Three major political parties emerged—the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC; from 1960 known as the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens), led by Azikiwe and largely based among the Igbo; the Action Group, led by Obafemi Awolowo and with a mostly Yoruba membership; and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), led by Ahmadu Bello and based in the north. The constitution proved unworkable by 1952, and a new one, solidifying the division of Nigeria into three regions (Eastern, Western, and Northern) plus the Federal Territory of Lagos, came into force in 1954. In 1956 the Eastern and Western regions became internally self-governing, and the Northern region achieved this status in 1959.

Independence and Internal Conflict
With Nigerian independence scheduled for 1960, elections were held in 1959. No party won a majority, and the NPC combined with the NCNC to form a government. Nigeria attained independence on Oct. 1, 1960, with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the NPC as prime minister and Azikiwe of the NCNC as governor-general; when Nigeria became a republic in 1963, Azikiwe was made president.

The first years of independence were characterized by severe conflicts within and between regions. In the Western region, a bloc of the Action Group split off (1962) under S. I. Akintola to form the Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP); in 1963 the Mid-Western region (whose population was mostly Edo) was formed from a part of the Western region. National elections late in 1964 were hotly contested, with an NPC-NNDP coalition (called the National Alliance) emerging victorious.

In Jan., 1966, Igbo army officers staged a successful coup, which resulted in the deaths of Federal Prime Minister Balewa, Northern Prime Minister Ahmadu Bello, and Western Prime Minister S. I. Akintola. Maj. Gen. Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo, became head of a military government and suspended the national and regional constitutions; this met with a violent reaction in the north. In July, 1966, a coup led by Hausa army officers ousted Ironsi (who was killed) and placed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon at the head of a new military regime. In Sept., 1966, many Igbo living in the north were massacred.

Gowon attempted to start Nigeria along the road to civilian government but met determined resistance from the Igbo, who were becoming increasingly fearful of their position within Nigeria. In May, 1967, the Eastern parliament gave Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, the region’s leader, authority to declare the region an independent republic. Gowon proclaimed a state of emergency, and, as a gesture to the Igbos, redivided Nigeria into 12 states (including one, the East-Central state, that comprised most of the Igbo people). However, on May 30, Ojukwu proclaimed the independent Republic of Biafra, and in July fighting broke out between Biafra and Nigeria.

Biafra made some advances early in the war, but soon federal forces gained the initiative. After much suffering, Biafra capitulated on Jan. 15, 1970, and the secession ended. The early 1970s were marked by reconstruction in areas that were formerly part of Biafra, by the gradual reintegration of the Igbo into national life, and by a slow return to civilian rule.

Modern Nigeria
Spurred by the booming petroleum industry, the Nigerian economy quickly recovered from the effects of civil war and made impressive advances. Nonetheless, inflation and high unemployment remained, and the oil boom led to government corruption and uneven distribution of wealth. Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1971. The prolonged drought that desiccated the Sahel region of Africa in the early 1970s had a profound effect on N Nigeria, resulting in a migration of peoples into the less arid areas and into the cities of the south.

Gowon’s regime was overthrown in 1975 by Gen. Murtala Muhammad and a group of officers who pledged a return to civilian rule. In the mid-1970s plans were approved for a new capital to be built at Abuja, a move that drained the national economy. Muhammad was assassinated in an attempted coup one year after taking office and succeeded by Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. In a crisis brought on by rapidly falling oil revenues, the government restricted public opposition to the regime, controlled union activity and student movements, nationalized land, and increased oil industry regulation. Nigeria sought Western support under Obasanjo while supporting African nationalist movements.

In 1979 elections were held under a new constitution, bringing Alhaji Shehu Shagari to the presidency. Relations with the United States reached a new high in 1979 with a visit by President Jimmy Carter. The government expelled thousands of foreign laborers in 1983, citing social disturbances as the reason. The same year, Shagari was reelected president but overthrown after only a few months in office.

In 1985 a coup led by Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida brought a new regime to power, along with the promise of a return to civilian rule. A new constitution was promulgated in 1990, which set national elections for 1992. Babangida annulled the results of that presidential election, claiming fraud. A new election in 1993 ended in the apparent presidential victory of Moshood Abiola, but Babangida again alleged fraud. Soon unrest led to Babangida’s resignation. Ernest Shonekan, a civilian appointed as interim leader, was forced out after three months by Gen. Sani Abacha, a long-time ally of Babangida, who became president and banned all political institutions and labor unions. In 1994, Abiola was arrested and charged with treason.

In 1995, Abacha extended military rule for three more years, while proposing a program for a return to civilian rule after that period; his proposal was rejected by opposition leaders, but five political parties were established in 1996. The Abacha regime drew international condemnation in late 1995 when Ken Saro-Wiwa, a prominent writer, and eight other human-rights activists were executed; the trial was condemned by human-rights groups and led to Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations. Also in 1995, a number of army officers, including former head of state General Obasanjo, were arrested in connection with an alleged coup attempt. In 1996, Kudirat Abiola, an activist on behalf of her imprisoned husband, was murdered.

Abacha died suddenly in June, 1998, and was succeeded by Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, who immediately freed Obasanjo and other political prisoners. Riots followed the announcement that Abiola had also died unexpectedly in July, 1998, while in detention. Abubakar then announced an election timetable leading to a return to civilian rule within a year. All former political parties were disbanded and new ones formed. A series of local, state, and federal elections were held between Dec., 1998, and Feb., 1999, culminating in the presidential contest, won by General Obasanjo. The elections were generally deemed fair by international monitors. The People’s Democratic party (PDP; the centrist party of General Obasanjo) dominated the elections; the other two leading parties were the Alliance for Democracy (a Yoruba party of the southwest, considered to be progressive), and the All People’s party (a conservative party based in the north).

Following Obasanjo’s inauguration on May 29, 1999, Nigeria was readmitted to the Commonwealth. The new president said he would combat past and present corruption in the Nigerian government and army and develop the impoverished Niger Delta area. Although there was some progress economically, government and political corruption remained a problem and the country was confronted with renewed ethnic and religious tension. The latter was in part a result of the institution of Islamic law in Nigeria’s northern states, and led to violence (continuing into 2004) in which an estimated 10,000 people have died since the end of military rule. Army lawlessness has also been a problem in some areas. A small success was achieved in Apr., 2002, when Abacha’s family agreed to return $1 billion to the government; the government had sought an estimated $4 billion in looted Nigerian assets.

In Mar., 2003, the Ijaw, accusing the Itsekiri, government, and oil companies of economic and political collusion against them, began militia attacks against Itsekiri villages and oil facilities in the Niger delta, leading to a halt in the delta’s oil production for several weeks and military intervention by the government. The presidential and earlier legislative elections in Apr., 2003, were won by President Obasanjo and his party, but the results were marred by vote rigging and some violence. The opposition protested the results, and unsuccessfully challenged the presidential election in court. The Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict continued into 2004, but a peace deal was reached in mid-June. The Ijaw backed out of the agreement, however, three weeks later. Christian-Muslim tensions also continued to be a problem in 2004, with violent attacks occurring in Kebbi, Kano, and Plateau states.

Obasanjo’s government appeared to move more forcefully against government corruption in early 2005. Several government ministers were fired on corruption charges, and the senate speaker resigned after he was accused of taking bribes. A U.S. investigation targeted Nigeria’s vice president the same year, and Obasanjo himself agreed to be investigated by the Nigerian financial crimes commission when he was accused of corruption by Orji Uzor Kalu, the governor of Abia and a target of a corruption investigation. Ijaw militants again threatened Niger delta oil operations in Sept., 2005, and several times in subsequent years, resulting in cuts in Nigeria’s oil production as large as 25% at times. Since early 2006 the Niger Delta area has seen an increase in kidnappings of foreign oil workers and attacks on oil operations. In Oct., 2005, the government reached an agreement to pay off much of its foreign debt at a discount, a process that was completed in Apr., 2006.

The end of 2005 and early 2006 saw increased contention over whether to amend the constitution to permit the president and state governors to run for more than two terms. The idea had been rejected in July, 2005, by a national political reform conference, but senators reviewing the conference’s proposals indicated they supported an end to term limits. The change was opposed by Vice President Atiku Abubakar, but other PDP leaders who objected were removed from their party posts. A census—a contentious event because of ethnic and religious divisions in Nigeria—was taken in Mar., 2006, but the head count was marred by a lack of resources and a number of violent clashes, and many Nigerians were believed to have been left uncounted. In May the Nigerian legislature ended consideration of a third presidential term when it became clear that there was insufficient support for amending the constitution. Nigeria agreed in June, 2006, to turn over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon after a two-year transition period.

In July the vice president denied taking bribes from a U.S. congressman, but in September the president called for the Nigerian senate to remove the vice president from office for fraud, based on an investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The senate agreed to investigate the charges, and the PDP suspended the vice president, blocking him from seeking the party’s presidential nomination. Abubakar counteraccused Obasanjo of corruption. The EFCC was also investigating most of Nigeria’s state governors, but the commission itself was tainted by charges that it was used for political retaliation by Obasanjo and his allies. Several state governors were impeached by legally unsound proceedings, moves that were seen as an attempt by Obasanjo to tighten his control prior to the 2007 presidential election.

When the vice president accepted (Dec., 2006) the presidential nomination of a group of opposition parties, the president accused him of technically resigning and sought to have him removed, an action Abubakar challenged in court; the government backed down the following month, and the courts later sided with Abubakar. In Jan., 2007, the results of the 2006 census were released, and they proved as divisive as previous Nigerian censuses. The census showed that the largely Muslim north had more inhabitants that the south, and many southern political leaders vehemently rejected the results.

In February, the EFCC declared Abubakar and more than 130 other candidates for the April elections unfit due to corruption, and the election commission barred those candidates from running. Abubakar fought the move in court, but the ruling was not overturned until days before the presidential election. The state elections were marred by widespread and blatant vote fraud and intimidation, but the election commission certified nearly all the results, handing gubernatorial victories to the PDP in 27 states. In the presidential election, Umaru Yar’Adua, the relatively unknown governor of Katsina state who was hand-picked by Obasanjo to be the PDP candidate, was declared the winner with 70% of the vote, but fraud and intimidation were so blatant that EU observers called the election a “charade” and the president was forced to admit it was “flawed.” Nonetheless, Yar’Adua’s inauguration (May) marked the first transition of power between two elected civilian presidents in Nigeria’s post-colonial history. Yar’Adua subsequently moved to reorganize and reform the national petroleum company, and the federal government has not interfered with challenges in the courts to state elections. Also in April there was battling between the army and Islamic militants in Kano state after the militants attacked the police there.

Source:InfoPlease

South Africa

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Source: Southafrica Info

History of South Africa
If the history of South Africa is in large part one of increasing racial divisiveness, today it can also be seen as the story of – eventually – a journey through massive obstacles towards the creation, from tremendous diversity, of a single nation whose dream of unity and common purpose is now capable of realisation.

The earliest people
The earliest representatives of South Africa’s diversity – at least the earliest we can name – were the San and Khoekhoe peoples (otherwise known individually as the Bushmen and Hottentots or Khoikhoi; collectively called the Khoisan). Both were resident in the southern tip of the continent for thousands of years before its written history began with the arrival of European seafarers.

And before that, modern human beings had lived here for more than 100 000 years – indeed, the country is an archaeological treasure chest.

The hunter-gatherer San ranged widely over the area; the pastoral Khoekhoe lived in those comparatively well-watered areas, chiefly along the southern and western coastal strips, where adequate grazing was to be found. So it was with the latter that the early European settlers first came into contact – much to the disadvantage of the Khoekhoe.

As a result of diseases such as smallpox imported by the Europeans, of some assimilation with the settlers and especially with the slaves who were to arrive in later years, and of some straightforward extermination, the Khoekhoe have effectively disappeared as an identifiable group.

Other long-term inhabitants of the area that was to become South Africa were the Bantu-speaking people who had moved into the north-eastern and eastern regions from the north, starting at least many hundreds of years before the arrival of the Europeans.

The Thulamela site in the northern Kruger National Park is estimated to have been first occupied in the 13th century. The ruins of Mapungubwe, where artefacts from as far away as China have been found, are the remains of a large trading settlement thought to stretch back to the 12th century. Agro-pastoralists, these people brought with them an Iron Age culture and sophisticated socio-political systems.

Settlers and slaves
Their existence was of little import to Jan van Riebeeck and the 90 men who landed with him in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope, under instructions by the Dutch East India Company to build a fort and develop a vegetable garden for the benefit of ships on the Eastern trade route.

Their relationship with the Khoekhoe was initially one of bartering, but a mutual animosity developed over issues such as cattle theft – and, no doubt, the growing suspicion on the part of the Khoekhoe that Van Riebeeck’s outpost was becoming a threat to them.

Perhaps the first sign that the threat was to be realised came in 1657 when nine men, released from their contracts, were given land to farm. In the same year the first slaves were imported. By the time Van Riebeeck left in 1662, 250 white people lived in what was beginning to look like a developing colony.

Later governors of the Cape Colony encouraged immigration, and in the early 1700s independent farmers called trekboers began to push north and east. Inevitably, the Khoisan started literally losing ground, in addition to being pressed by difficult circumstances into service for the colonists.

The descendants of some of the Khoisan, slaves from elsewhere in Africa and the East, and white colonists formed the basis of the mixed-race group now known as “coloured”. It is noteworthy that the slaves from the East brought a potent new ingredient to South Africa’s racial and cultural mix, especially with their religion of Islam.

As the colonists began moving east, they encountered the Xhosa-speaking people living in the region that is today’s Eastern Cape. A situation of uneasy trading and more or less continuous warfare began to develop.

By this time, the second half of the 18th century, the colonists – mainly of Dutch, German and French Huguenot stock – had begun to lose their sense of identification with Europe. The Afrikaner nation was coming into being.

As a result of developments in Europe, the British took the Cape over from the Dutch in 1795. Seven years later, the colony was returned to the Dutch government, only to come under British rule again in 1806, recaptured because of the alliance between Holland and Napoleon.

The initially somewhat cautious regulations aimed at ameliorating the conditions under which, for instance, Khoi servants were employed, caused discontent and even open rebellion among the colony’s white inhabitants.

The Cape frontier wars
At the same time, British military strength began to tell in the conflict with the Xhosa. In 1820, some 5 000 newly arrived British settlers were placed on the eastern frontier as a supposed defensive buffer against the Xhosa – a strategy that failed when many of them gave up the struggle with uncooperative land and turned to other occupations in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown.

The Xhosa reacted with heroic defiance at the additional pressure on their land and independence. But this ended tragically with the mass starvation that followed an 1857 prophecy that the whites would return to the sea if the Xhosa slaughtered their cattle and destroyed their crops.

After 1806, philanthropist missionaries had begun arriving, their liberalising influence reaching its high point in the activities of John Philip, friend of the British abolitionist William Wilberforce and local superintendent of the London Missionary Society.

The Great Trek
This development and, in particular, the emancipation of slaves in 1834, had dramatic effects on the colony, precipitating the Great Trek, an emigration north and east of about 12 000 discontented Afrikaner farmers, or Boers. These people were determined to live independently of colonial rule and what they saw as unacceptable racial egalitarianism.

The early decades of the century had seen another event of huge significance: the rise to power of the great Zulu king, Shaka. His wars of conquest and those of Mzilikazi – a general who broke away from Shaka on a northern path of conquest – caused a calamitous disruption of the interior known as the mfecane.

Ironically, it was this that denuded much of the area into which Trekkers now moved, enabling them to settle there with a belief that they were occupying vacant territory. But this belief was by no means accompanied by an absence of conflict with the Zulu armies and others.

Initially, many Trekkers moved east into the Natal area, today the province of KwaZulu-Natal, under the leadership of Piet Retief. Intending to negotiate for land, Retief was murdered with a party of followers and servants at the kraal of Dingane, Shaka’s successor.

The Battle of Blood River
In the war that followed, the Boers won victory at the Battle of Blood River. They began to settle in Natal, but smaller conflicts followed and the British – fearing repercussions in the Cape Colony – annexed Natal, where a small British settlement called Port Natal (later Durban) had already been established.

On the highveld, however, two Boer republics were formed: the central Orange Free State and South African Republic (Transvaal or ZAR – Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) to its north.

By the mid-1800s, the tiny refreshment post at the Cape of Good Hope had grown into an area of white settlement that stretched over virtually all of what is today South Africa.

In some areas the indigenous Bantu-speakers maintained their independence, most notably in the northern Natal territories, which were still unmistakably the kingdom of the Zulu. Almost all were eventually to lose the struggle against white overlordship – British or Boer.

One territory that was to retain independence was the mountain fastness where King Moshoeshoe had forged the Basotho nation by offering refuge to tribes fleeing the mfecane. Clashing with the Free Staters, Moshoeshoe asked Britain to annex Basotholand, which was done in 1868. Known today as Lesotho, this country is entirely surrounded by South Africa, but has never been a part of it.

The Cape Colony was granted representative legislature in 1853 and self-government in 1872. Between these two dates, a dramatic new element was introduced to the economic, and consequently political, balance – the discovery of diamonds and subsequent establishment of Kimberley.

For the first time it became evident that there was wealth for the taking in the subcontinent. Rival claims by the Orange Free State, the ZAR and Nicholas Waterboer, chief of the West Griquas – a community of mixed race – were defeated and the area was incorporated into the Cape Colony in 1880.

As a British territory, it was a perfect proving ground for the young Cecil John Rhodes, one of the many thousands to be attracted by the diggings, and one who made his fortune there.

The colony had taken tentative steps towards political equality among the races. The franchise was based on economic qualifications, non-racial in theory but excluding the vast majority of African and coloured people in practice. Among those who did qualify, many became politically active across colour lines. The promise existed of progress towards full political inclusion of the population.

Natal, and the Battle of Isandhlwana
The Colony of Natal, however, was developing along somewhat different lines, the size of the Zulu nation assuming threatening proportions to the colonists. Reserves were created under traditional African law for refugees from Zulu might; outside those reserves, British law held sway. As almost all blacks were deemed to fall under the rule of the chiefs in the reserves, almost none had any chance of political rights outside their borders.

Economically, Natal had the advantage of being ideal for the cultivation of sugar cane. The consequent labour requirements led to the importation of indentured labourers from India, many of whom – in spite of discrimination – remained in the country after their contracts had expired: the forebears of today’s significant and influential Indian population.

The late 19th century was an area of aggressive colonial expansion, and the Zulus were bound to come under pressure. But they were not to prove easy pickings. Under King Cetshwayo, they delivered resounding proof at Isandhlwana in 1879 that the British army was not invincible.

However, they were defeated in the following year, leading to Zululand eventually being incorporated into Natal in 1897.


Gold and War 

Britain achieved a temporary expansion of its southern African rule in the politically unstable north, where the unpopularity of President TF Burgers opened the way for Britain to annex the Transvaal in 1877. It lost control again after a rebellion that dealt another blow to the military pride of the empire at Majuba.

The eventual resolution was the granting of qualified independence in 1881 and full internal autonomy in 1884 – by which time the conservative and intensely pro-Afrikaner Paul Kruger had been elected president of the restored, but financially strapped, republic.

Two years later, when gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand, Kruger presided over a financial turnaround of spectacular proportions – but he also saw a serious threat to Afrikaner independence develop as huge numbers of newcomers, mostly British, descended on the gold fields.

Without urgent action, these people (the uitlanders, or foreigners) would soon qualify for the vote. The response was to create stringent franchise qualifications, an action which, with its 14-year residence stipulation, would at least postpone the difficulty.

Rhodes and the Jameson Raid
In the Cape, however, Cecil John Rhodes had become Prime Minister. His overriding vision of a federation of British-controlled states in southern Africa was well served by the growing discontent of the uitlanders and exasperation of the mining magnates in the ZAR.

Rhodes’ first attempt at takeover, however, came to an ignominious end when his plan to have Leander Starr Jameson lead a raid into Johannesburg in response to a planned uitlander uprising failed. The uprising did not happen: Jameson rode precipitously into the Transvaal and had to surrender. Rhodes resigned.

The Jameson Raid had a polarising effect. Afrikaners in the Cape and the Orange Free State, though disapproving of Kruger in many ways, became more sympathetic to his anti-British stance. The Orange Free State, under President MT Steyn, formed a military alliance with the Transvaal.

The Anglo-Boer War
In Britain, however, Rhodes and Jameson were popular heroes. It kept up the pressure on Kruger, and the Anglo-Boer/South African War began in October 1899. Up to half a million British soldiers squared up against some 65 000 Boers; black South Africans were pulled into the conflict on both sides.

Again, Britain’s military reputation suffered a blow as the Boers set siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking (Mafikeng – home at the time to a young black diarist named Sol Plaatje, whose initially pro-British attitudes were to be severely shaken by the shameful treatment of the town’s black inhabitants during the siege).

Under Major General Herbert Kitchener and Field Marshal Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, however, the British offensive gained force, and by 1900 Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria were occupied. Kruger fled for Europe.

The Boer reply was to intensify guerilla war – General Jan Smuts, who had been Kruger’s state attorney, led his troops to within 190 kilometres of Cape Town – and in response Kitchener adopted a scorched-earth policy and set up racially separate civilian concentration camps in which some 26 000 Boer women and children and 14 000 black and coloured people were to die in appalling conditions.

The war ended in Boer defeat at the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902.

Union and ANC
Many blacks saw the British victory in the Anglo-Boer war as the hoped-for opportunity to put all four colonies on an equal and just footing, but the treaty left their franchise rights to be decided by the white authorities. The ex-Boer republics retained the whites-only franchise.

In 1909 a delegation appointed by the South African Native Convention, including representatives of the coloured and Indian populations, went to London to plead the case of the country’s black population.

But when the Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910, the only province with a non-racial franchise was the Cape, and blacks were barred from being members of parliament. Of the estimated 6-million inhabitants of the Union in that year, 67% were black African, 9% coloured and 2.5% Asian.

The South African Party, a merging of the previous Afrikaner parties, held power under the premiership of General Louis Botha.

The 1913 Land Act and the ANC
Repressive measures to entrench white power were not long in coming – the Masters and Servants Act, the reservation of skilled work for whites, pass laws, the Native Poll Tax and the 1913 Land Act which reserved 90% of the country for white ownership.

By the time this Act was passed, the African National Congress (ANC) had come into being on January 8 1912, in Bloemfontein, in an act of unity joining an educated elite, the rural classes and tribal structures. The committee included Sol Plaatje as secretary; the first president of the ANC was the Rev John L Dube. Both formed part of a second unsuccessful delegation to London, this time to protest the land grab.

Resistance started to assume a more outspoken and militant form, especially when several hundred black women marched in Bloemfontein to protest against being forced to buy passes every month. Similar protests were held in other places, and participants arrested. The women were harshly treated in jail.

Mohandas Gandhi
The Indian community were also suffering under viciously racist treatment – in 1891 they had been expelled from the Orange Free State altogether. Mohandas Gandhi, then a young lawyer who had arrived in South Africa in 1892, had become a leading figure in Indian resistance.

The struggle against the £3 Indian poll tax in Natal involved a mass strike in which a number of Indians were killed, but achieved success when the tax was removed in 1914 – the year Gandhi, then known as Mahatma, left the country.

Afrikaner polarisation
In the white camp, Botha and Smuts were in favour of reconciliation with English South Africans. But they did not represent the whole of the embittered Afrikaner nation, and JBM Hertzog formed the more conservative Nationalist Party. Afrikaner polarisation assumed dramatic form when South Africa entered the First World War in support of Britain and anti-British Afrikaners unsuccessfully rebelled.

Still hoping for support from the British government – there had been further delegations – the ANC supported involvement in the war and unknown numbers of black soldiers died.

(South Africa gained control over the previously German-held South West Africa – now Namibia – as a result of the war; the territory became a Union mandate.)

Black workers, white workers
With the inspiration of the October Revolution in Russia, the post-war period was marked by strike action. In 1918, a million black mine workers went on strike for higher wages, and 71 000 did the same in 1920 – the latter strike successfully extracting a wage increase.

Between those strikes, 1919 saw the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union of South Africa and the convening of the South African Indian Congress. In the same year, Botha died and Smuts became Prime Minister.

If official (white) South Africa was taking its place in the wider world as a result of the First World War, the ANC was beginning to see itself as part of the wider African efforts against colonialism in Africa. In its 1918 constitution it referred to itself as a “Pan African Association” and the organisation attended the second congress of the international Pan African Movement in 1921 (not to be confused with the later South African Pan-Africanist Congress).

Another strike was looming on the mines – by a different group of miners. Rising costs and a falling gold price led the Chamber of Mines to allow the lower-paid African miners to do semi-skilled work. White miners reacted violently in a 1922 strike, militarily suppressed by Smuts. Hertzog’s Nationalists found increased support in the white Labour Party, and an election pact saw Smuts ousted and Hertzog as Prime Minister in 1924.

The next decade saw Hertzog successfully working for increased independence from British control and greater job reservation security for whites. Franchise acts extended the vote to all white men and women, but left the still existing black vote in the Cape restricted to men.

Birth of the Nationalist Party
The government’s popularity with its voters declined, however, with economic depression in the early 1930s, forcing Hertzog into a Smuts coalition government in 1933 (the year before South Africa became independent from Great Britain). Their parties fused as the United Party, but Hertzog’s move was balanced by the breaking away on the right of DF Malan’s new Nationalist Party as a political home for the more extreme Afrikaner nationalists.

Not that the new government displayed any noticeable leftist tendencies: in 1936 black Cape voters were removed from the common roll; in the following year laws were passed to stem black urbanisation and compel municipalities to segregate black African and white residents.

The Hertzog-Smuts coalition fell apart with the Second World War, Smuts winning the power battle to form a government that took South Africa into the war. Afrikaner opposition to the war strengthened Malan’s support base.

ANC Youth League, Natal Indian Congress
At the same time, developments in the ANC symbolically marked the start of what was to be nearly 50 years of head-to-head conflict between that organisation and the Nationalist Party. In April 1944 the ANC Youth League was formed. Its first president was AM Lembede (who died three years later); Nelson Mandela was its secretary. Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu were among those who came to the fore as the influence of the Youth League in the broader ANC increased.

It was a time of rapid industrial expansion, but skilled work remained the domain of whites. On the other hand, the black influx into urban areas combined with the continuing repression strengthened black resistance. A Bill introduced by Smuts in 1946, for instance, aimed at curtailing the movement, residence and property ownership of Indians led to mass defiance and the rapid expansion of the Natal Indian Congress.

Apartheid entrenched
The ideals of the United Nations cast a spotlight on the country’s racial inequity, and the first of many attacks on the country in the General Assembly came from the Indian government in 1946.

The Nationalist Party, however, was gathering strength and, in a surprise result, gained power in the 1948 election – power that it would not relinquish until 1994. Apartheid became official government ideology.

The 1950s were to bring increasingly repressive laws against black South Africans and its obvious corollary – increasing resistance.

The Group Areas Act, rigidifying the racial division of land, and the Population Registration Act, which classified all citizens by race, were passed in 1950. The pass laws, restricting black movement, came in 1952. The Separate Amenities Act of 1953 introduced “petty apartheid” segregation, for example, on buses and in post offices. In that year Malan retired and JG Strijdom became Prime Minister.

The Defiance Campaign
In reaction to all this came the mass mobilisation of the Defiance Campaign, starting in 1952. Based on non-violent resistance, it nevertheless led to the jailing of thousands of participants.

The result was to increase unity among resistance groups with the forming of the Congress Alliance, which included black, coloured, Indian and white resistance organisations as well as the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

In 1954 a campaign against the deliberately inferior Bantu Education System was launched.

The Freedom Charter
The following year saw two of the most significant events of the decade.

One established how far the government was willing to go to pursue its aims. Unable to gain the two-thirds majority required by the 1910 constitution to remove coloureds from the common voters’ roll, the government changed the composition of the Senate by increasing its size (and consequently Nationalist majority) to give it the required majority in a joint sitting of the Senate and the House of Assembly.

The second watershed moment came when, after an ANC campaign to gather mass input on freedom demands, the Freedom Charter – based on the principles of human rights and non-racialism – was signed on June 26 1955 at the Congress of the People in Soweto.

Reaction was swift: the following year 156 leaders of the ANC and its allies were charged with high treason. The longest trial in South African history was to lead to the acquittal of all accused in 1961.

Strijdom died in 1958, to be succeeded by HF Verwoerd. The following year representatives of black Africans were removed from both houses of parliament and the Cape provincial council.

On the other side of the political fence, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), founded by Robert Sobukwe, broke away from the Congress Alliance.

The stage was set for the even more polarised 1960s.

The 1950s had still offered many opportunities to resolve South Africa’s racial injustices peacefully. This, however, was contrary to official ideology. Instead, apartheid transmuted itself into the policy of “separate development”: the division of the black population into ethnic “nations”, each of which was to have its own “homeland” and eventual “independence”.

The Sharpeville Massacre
A turning point came at Sharpeville on March 21 1960 when a PAC-organised passive anti-pass campaign came to a bloody conclusion with police killing 69 unarmed protesters. A State of Emergency was declared: detention without trial was introduced and the ANC, PAC and other organisations were declared illegal. The resistance groups went underground.

South Africa’s isolation increased in 1961 when, following a white referendum, South Africa became a republic and Verwoerd took it out of the Commonwealth. A general strike was called to coincide with the May 31 institution of the republic.

At the end of that year, Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation), emerged with acts of sabotage against government installations. Originally formed by a group of individuals within the ANC, including Mandela, it was to become that organisation’s armed wing.

A new stage of international pressure began when the UN General Assembly called on its members to institute economic sanctions against South Africa. Mandela, in the meanwhile, had travelled through Africa making contact with numerous leaders. Going underground on his return, he was arrested in Natal in August 1962 and received a three-year sentence for incitement.

The Rivonia Trial
In July 1963 a police raid on the Rivonia farm Lilliesleaf led to the arrest of several of Mandela’s senior ANC colleagues, including Walter Sisulu. They were charged with sabotage, Mandela being brought from prison to stand trial with them. All were sentenced in 1964 to life imprisonment and taken to Robben Island.

In September 1966 BJ Vorster became Prime Minister after the assassination in parliament of Verwoerd. Segregation became even more strictly enforced. Reeling under the blow of the “Rivonia Trial”, the ANC nevertheless continued to operate, regrouping at the Morogoro Conference in Tanzania in 1969.

The first half of the next decade was marked by increasing repression, increasing militancy in the resistance camp, and extensive strikes.

June 16, 1976
The moment of truth came on June 16, 1976, when the youth of Soweto marched against being taught in the medium of Afrikaans. Police fired on them, precipitating a massive flood of violence that overwhelmed the country.

Nevertheless, an attempt was made to further the “homeland” policy, with Transkei being the first to accept nominal independence later that year.

A new movement known as Black Consciousness had become increasingly influential. The death as a result of police brutality of its charismatic founder, Steve Biko, shocked the world in 1977.

PW Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978 after Vorster’s retirement, tried to co-opt the coloured and Indian population in the early 1980s with a new constitution establishing a Tricameral Parliament, with separate houses for these groups. The constitution also did away with the post of Prime Minister and provided for an executive State President.

Opposition came from both left and right, a section of the right wing splitting off from the National Party. The United Democratic Front, an internal coalition of anti-apartheid groups, organised highly successful boycotts of the coloured and Indian elections in 1984.

State of emergency
There was a further escalation of violence, with the country being governed – as far as it was governable – under a state of emergency in a spiral of revolution and repression. International sanctions increased.

Among the other organisations in the spotlight at this time were the trade union body Cosatu and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha, the latter involved in bloody conflict with pro-ANC factions.

1989 was the year in which the logjam started to break up. Negotiations had been entered into between Mandela and PW Botha, but these were secret. Dissension within the Nationalist Party, in combination with Botha’s ill health, led to his resignation, and he was replaced by FW de Klerk.

After an election in September, De Klerk released Walter Sisulu and seven other political prisoners.

The death of Apatheid 

On February 2 1990, FW de Klerk lifted restrictions on 33 opposition groups, including the ANC, the PAC and the Communist Party, at the opening of Parliament. On February 11 Mandela, who had maintained a tough negotiating stance on the issue, was released after 27 years in prison.

The piecemeal dismantling of restrictive legislation began. Political groups started negotiating the ending of white minority rule, and in early 1992 the white electorate endorsed De Klerk’s stance on these negotiations in a referendum.

Violence continued unabated, a massacre at the township of Boipatong causing the ANC to withdraw temporarily from constitutional talks.

In 1993, however, an agreement was reached on a Government of National Unity which would allow a partnership of the old regime and the new.

The optimism generated by the negotiations was shattered by the assassination of Chris Hani, the secretary-general of the Communist Party: only a prompt appeal to the nation by Mandela averted a massive reaction. At the end of the year an interim constitution was agreed to by 21 political parties.

First democratic elections
South Africa’s first democratic election was held on 26, 27 and 28 April 1994, with victory going to the ANC in an alliance with the Communist Party and Cosatu. Nelson Mandela was sworn in as President on May 10 with FW de Klerk and the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki as Deputy Presidents.

Mandela’s presidency was characterised by the successful negotiation of a new constitution; a start on the massive task of restructuring the civil service and attempts to redirect national priorities to address the results of apartheid; and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set up primarily to investigate the wrongs of the past.

In the country’s second democratic election on 2 June 1999 the ANC marginally increased its majority and Thabo Mbeki became President. The New Nationalist Party, previously the official opposition, lost ground and ceded that position to the Democratic Party, which later became the Democratic Alliance.

In 2004 South Africa’s third democtaic election went off peacefully, with Thabo Mbeki and the ANC again returning to power, and the Democratic Alliance retaining its position as official opposition.

Source:Southafrica Info

Justice Kpegah sues government

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wpid-Justice-Francis-Yaonasu-Kpegah-a-retired-Supreme-Court-judge.jpgA Supreme Court Judge, Justice Francis Kpegah has sued the government for alleged breaches of the 1992 Constitution.

He wants the government to appear before the highest court of the land to answer 14 charges on a wide range of issues.

Justice Kpegah wants a declaration by the court that the decision by National Security to ban four former security persons from all military installations was illegal.

In a writ filed at the at the Supreme Court in a rare case, Justice Kpegah also describes the sale of government?s 70 percent shares in Ghana Telecom to Vodafone and the redenomination of the cedi as fraudulent transactions.

The sitting Judge in his statement of claim, said the government?s economic policy based on property owning democracy reflects in the lives of official and cronies of the administration.

Asked what his motives are for filing the writ now by Joy News? Sampson Laadi Ayinene, Justice Kpeha said his reasons were contained in his statement of claim and therefore will not want to state them on radio.

He claimed a plan by the military high command to sell all lands and other assets of the Ghana Armed Forces is an act which contravenes the Constitution and amounts to disbanding the GAF.

He asked where the arms of the GAF will be sent to if the lands are sold to people who want vacant possession of the lands.

He cites the Palava Newspaper as having published a story about the proposed sale of the official residence of the Chief of Defense Staff.

Justice Kpegah is also seeking a declaration that the NPP government has reached its economic wit end and call for national dialogue as to the direction of the country?s economy necessary.

He stressed it was not a mutt point asking our man, Sampson as to whether he was one of the privileged ones and if he was not suffering.

?Is not a mutt point, is a reality on the ground or you are not suffering or you are one of the privileged few.?

The applicant apologized to the NPP Youth Organiser, John Boadu for wrongfully citing him as having donated one billion old cedis to the campaign of Mr. Alan Kyerematen during the flagbearership race of the NPP.

At a point he begged Sampson to end the interview.

A Lecturer at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Mr. Ernest Kofi Abotsi said Justice Kpegah was exercising his fundamental right because under the Constitution every citizen has the right to bring matters to court for the enforcement of the Constitutional provisions.

?The only difficulty, however, is the fact that you cannot easily disentangle the fact of his judgeship, the fact that he is a Supreme Judge from this claim and that creates some difficulties,? he said.

Mr. Abotsi said his presumed neutrality as a Supreme Court Judge vis-?-vis political issues in the makes his case a bit dicey.

?A statement such as a government is at its wit end is heavily political in character, the tone is heavily political, and it creates a problem of perception of partisanship which is problematic I think in the circumstances not to mention the fact that the particular claim seems to truncate other notions of constitutionality as far as the 1992 constitution is concerned.

?The 1992 Constitution creates a clear structure and modalities for the change of government or for the installation of government and the claim made by the applicant is not contemplated by the Constitution.

?The Constitution does not even speak of a coalition government, (it) does not speak of a change of government before the four years no matter how disastrous that government is.

?So in the circumstances of our Constitution, we will have to wait for four years before any government is changed,? he explained.

Source:?Malik Abass Daabu/JFM

NDC 2008 Manifesto For A Better Ghana ? Don?t Mind the Body but Mind the Engine

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The cover pages of the NDC 2008 manifesto are colorful and even attractive. However, beyond those colorful pages are 100 pages of ideas, policy objectives, and agenda that will guide the government should the people of Ghana decide to hire Professor Atta Mills as President in December. It is important to debate and discuss these ideas as part of a campaign to inform the voters as they get ready to exercise their suffrage in less than 2 months. The manifesto is built around 4 themes: (i) Governance; (ii) Economy; (iii) People; and (iv) Infrastructure. In this incipient discussion, I will focus on the Governance leg of the manifesto.

The manifesto defines Governance as ?the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of our nation?s affairs.? The party?s primary Governance strategy ?is to mobilize ordinary citizens to claim back their government and implement activities that will enhance the participation and promote the interests of ordinary Ghanaians.? This strategy will be effectuated in seven areas: (1) governance reform; (2) corporate governance; (3) e-governance; (4) law and justice; (5) human safety and security; (6) local government and decentralization; and (7) international relations for development. The discussion below focuses on the first five areas.

Governance Reform

On governance reform, the manifesto lays out the party?s ideas for parliament, corruption, women and governance, media, civil society and the constitution. I, next, summarize my understanding and assessment of those ideas.

PARLIAMENT: The manifesto identifies three issues with parliament: (i) whether the appointment of some ministers from parliament compromise the independence of parliament; (ii) whether parliament is adequately resourced; and (iii) how to enhance parliament?s oversight responsibility. On the first issue, the proposed solution is to ?subject the issue to a critical reflection by major stakeholders ? and use the results of such consultations as the basis of firm proposals to parliament.? On the second issue, the solution is to ?adhere to the constitutional space provided for Parliament to define its financial needs, and for these to be satisfied within the limits of public resources without undue delays and unwarranted cutbacks.? On the third issue, the solution is to ?reinforce this role by empowering the relevant committees and extending this function to cover other senior public officials.?

Anyone with a modest sophistication at evaluating public policy can readily see that these are not ideas at all. It shows unpreparedness and lack of foresight for a political party to offer consultations as its panacea for what it has identified as a threat to the independence of parliament. To say that an NDC government will allow parliament to define its financial needs subject to public resources is to say absolutely nothing. And to say that relevant committees will be empowered to enhance their oversight roles is both too little and too much, which is a kind way of saying it is a meaningless proposal.

Still on parliament, the manifesto proposes three bad ideas and one good idea. First, the party plans to construct and furnish a standard MP?s office in each of the 230 constituencies. Second, each MP will be allowed to hire an administrator, whose salaries and benefits will become a charge on the consolidated fund. Third, the party plans to set up a ?constituency development fund? for each MP. Finally, the party plans to assign a university graduate in liberal arts and humanities to serve as a research assistant for each MP.

It is hard to understand why the NDC sees building a standard MP office in each constituency as a priority. This is especially so when it built standard MP homes in Accra, which they then sold on the cheap to the MPs of the 1st parliament. If MPs need to do work for their constituents, they should arrange with the various districts, churches, schools, etc. to set up meeting places. For the same reason, hiring an administrator to man these MP houses is indicative of a party that still does not understand our budgetary constraints. I have always been against the notion of setting aside funds for MPs, to be used according to their discretion. These funds are better allocated to the district assemblies, who can then set their own priorities. I, however, am supportive of assigning a research assistant to each MP but reject the notion that the assigned servicemen should be in liberal arts or humanities. MPs make decisions on health, roads, budgets, etc and could use help from assistants with expertise in various areas.

CORRUPTION: Corruption, probably the biggest problem in our polity, has the potential to reach epidemic proportions with the discovery and commercial production of oil in the western region. The NDC must therefore be given credit for addressing this issue in its manifesto. Unfortunately its proposals to address the problem lack clarity, thoughtfulness, seriousness, and creativity. At the heart of its anti-corruption effort, is a ?program of encouraging citizens to demand accountability and blowing the whistle on corrupt officials and practices.? Because this is reminiscent of the Citizenship Vetting Committee, it is important that its parameters be clarified. There is also a promise to strengthen CHRAJ and SFO, although no specifics are offered on how the strengthening will be done to arrest corruption. There is also a sentence on asset declaration (the law will be revised to make it functional and effective in ensuring probity and accountability) Sadly, all the proposals focus on detection of corruption, although the best way to address corruption is emplacing preventive controls, such as business performance reviews, segregation of duties, information processing controls, and audits. On balance, it seems the NDC is merely paying lip service to corruption as evidenced by the 4 or so paragraphs devoted to it in a manifesto of over 100 pages.

WOMEN AND GOVERNANCE: According to the manifesto, an NDC government ?shall strengthen the position of women and significantly increase their number in senior governance posts, improve the conditions of poor women and actively promote gender equality and equity.? Of course, this does not say much as it is a generic statement that can be found in the manifesto of just about most modern political parties. The real test is the specific proposals put forward to advance this agenda. Here, we are told that ?the NDC government shall introduce major gender policy and legislative reforms, aiming for a minimum of 40% representation of women at conferences and congresses of the party and in government and public service.? Needless to say, the P/NDC does not have to be in government to assure a 40% representation of women at its conferences and congresses. The proportion of women at their conferences and parliamentary caucus should give the best clue of where it stands on gender issues and whether gender equality will be its priority. The manifesto also talks about intensifying public education against negative socio-cultural practices that discriminate against women. This is welcome and I hope the NDC will speak against the culture that allows men to marry their wives? relatives. MEDIA: During its tenure from 1981 to 1992, the PNDC was openly hostile to the media culminating in the so called culture of silence. This relationship did not change under the NDC even after the advent of the constitution in 1992. The NDC criminalized speech and made prison graduates out of Malik Kwaku Baako, Haruna Atta, Ebenezer Quarcoo, etc. Alas, it often got an assist from the Supreme Court, whose mechanical interpretation of the free speech clause allowed the criminal libel laws to swallow the constitutional guaranteed freedom of speech. Fortunately, one of the first acts of the NPP government was to get rid of the obnoxious criminal libel laws. A potential NDC government?s thinking on the media is therefore important to assessing whether it has made a clear break with the past.

While the manifesto is unclear as to where the NDC stands on criminal libel and the media, there are some danger signals. First, the manifesto indicates that ?the NDC will expect the media to be fair, objective and truthful in a true spirit of partnership with government for promoting national cohesion and sustainable development.? Second, ?the NDC government will maintain a principled relationship with the media, constantly reminding each other that what is right under one government does not suddenly turn wrong when government changes hands.? Third, the ?career progression and development of journalists will engage the serious attention of the NDC government, and a programme of sponsorship of journalists for further training and specialization will be instituted.? These are 3 dangerous ideas that should be of concern to the media and citizenry. The expectation of media fairness suggests that the NDC will monitor the media and will take corrective actions when, in its opinion, the media falls short of expectation. The proposed principled relationship is contrary to the free and independent media contemplated by the constitution. Monitoring the career progression of journalists should clearly not be the role of any government. My interpretation of this tripartite proposal is that the NDC plans to use a ?carrot and stick? approach to muzzle the media. The manifesto states the nature of the carrots (career enhancement from good journalists), the performance benchmark (expectation of fairness, etc) but leaves unspecified the nature of the stick. I am unable to rule out the return of criminal libel under an NDC government.

CIVIL SERVICE: The manifesto devotes 2 paragraphs to the civil service. First, an NDC government will ensure a civil service leadership ?characterized by competence and provide a remuneration structure that will make civil servants more effective and efficient.? Second, the NDC government will locate the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) in the office of the President to be chaired by the President. The first policy is half-baked because of the absence of specifics. To be taken seriously, a manifesto should be more than platitudes. The second policy is bad and suggests some confusion as to the role of the NDPC. Under the constitution, the NDPC shall advise the President on development planning policy and strategy (article 87(1)) and shall be

responsible to the President (article 85(3)). Further, the NDPC shall consist of a chairman who shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the council of state (article 85(2)). In light of these constitutional provisions, it is clear that the plan to locate it to the office of the President does not mean much and the plan to have the President chair the commission is in clear contravention of article 85(2).

CIVIL SOCIETY: The manifesto identifies civil society as a critical part of the governance process. However, the only plan for civil society is to ?provide the necessary support and environment in which civil society organizations will flourish.? This, again, is both too little and too much. It fails to shed any meaningful light on the party?s plans for civil society.

CONSTITUTION: Although this is advertised as part of the governance reform agenda, there is no specific plan or even statement about it. Corporate Governance Corporate governance refers to the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions that define the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. Forensic audit of 11 state owned enterprises for the period that the NDC was in office revealed that questionable corporate governance practices had led to losses of over ?1.3 Trillion (old cedis). This was in addition to mysterious diversification practices (e.g., CARIDEM), unilateral guarantee of loans (e.g., Quality Grain and Valley Farms), and lack of accountability (e.g., delayed audit reports and inaction by the public accounts committee). In light of this history, the NDC?s plans on corporate governance assume additional importance.

Alas, the manifesto does not shed light on the party plans to avoid the recurrence of the problems that existed during its tenure. With respect to private sector corporate governance, the manifesto states ?the NDC government will engage the private sector and regulatory agencies to ensure that good corporate governance standards and guidelines are set.? This, of course, is no plan at all. With respect to the public sector, ?companies will be restructured with emphasis on responsibility, accountability, and performance. The composition of Board of Directors will emphasize quality, competence and professionalism, and they shall operate within the overall policy framework set by the government.? Again, these are worthwhile goals that do not invite debate and are shared by all parties. What is lacking and troubling is the absence of specific plans, actions, or tactics. The only specific idea that I found was a statement that ?as far as practicable, ministers and MPs shall not be appointed to positions of chairman and members of Board of Directors of public sector companies in order to avoid conflict of interest situations.? This is a positive idea, except that the ?as far as practicable? caveat should give the voter cause for concern.

Nkrumah?s Eternal Endowment on Governance

An NDC government plans to declare Dr. Nkrumah?s birthday a national holiday with effect from his 100th birthday annivessary. Expectedly, the manifesto does not provide any cost/benefit analysis. Nor do I have any reason to believe that the party has given any serious thought on the cost to the economy of the over 14 public holidays that we currently have on the books. When it comes to holidays, we need less not more.

E-Governance

E-Governance refers to the use of information communication technology as a platform for exchanging information, providing services and transacting with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. If implemented properly, it can empower citizens and enhance government and business productivity. The manifesto states ?a network design for the whole country will start in earnest. This design will take into account the existing infrastructure, the expected expansion and the expected traffic.? This is a good focus but falls far short of what is needed to be taken seriously. For instance, how much does an NDC government plan to spend? What will be given up in order to fund this project? How much will be spent on training staff to bring them up to speed? Without these specifics, budgets, and milestones, the manifesto is reduced to statements of agreed-upon aspirations. Moreover, without these specifics, the Office of Evaluation and Oversight, a proposed new office to monitor the fulfillment of promises made in the manifesto, will have an impossible task and end up as a deadweight, job-for-the boys agency, whose costs are absorbed by the ever shrinking and over-stretched consolidated funds.

Law and Justice

According to the manifesto, the NDC aims to ?restore confidence in and respect for the judiciary, make it truly independent and close any loopholes that tend to tempt and encourage executive manipulation of the judiciary.? Further, ?justice will be made available to all, especially the poor, and court procedures will be reviewed to expedite court processes. Measures to improve the human resource base of the judiciary as well as the quality of judgments will be pursued.? The party also set some benchmarks, which include placing a ceiling on the number of Supreme Court Justices, empanelling all Supreme Court Justices, separating the Attorney General?s department from the ministry of justice, sponsoring sitting judges for further studies, reviewing the legal aid act, etc.

Again, because no budgetary information and milestones are provided, it is hard to take these proposals seriously. But there are some ideas that should concern all Ghanaians who care about the independence of the judiciary. For instance, it is very disturbing that the NDC plans to take measures to ?improve the quality of judgments? and ?make the judiciary truly independent.? The manifesto does not detail the measures that the party will take to do these things but it seems clear that the NDC does not understand the judiciary is a co-equal branch of government and must at all times be free from executive interference, intimidation, and invectives. It is probably worth reminding the NDC that in spite of its perspectives or predispositions, the administration of justice is within the sole purview of the judiciary.

Article 127 (1) is very clear that ?In the exercise of the judicial power of Ghana, the Judiciary, in both its judicial and administrative functions, including financial administration, is subject only to this Constitution and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority.? Thus, many of the measures outlined in the manifesto, which appear to interfere with the exercise of the judicial function, are worrisome indeed.

Human Safety and Security

The manifesto breaks this into two parts: (1) fighting narcotic trafficking and (2) protecting the people.

On fighting narcotic trafficking, the manifesto is long on accusing the NPP government of not doing much but short on what an NDC government will do. First, an NDC government ?will not allow this country to be turned into a subsidiary of drug cartels.? Second, an government ?will faithfully and diligently discharge our international obligations especially relating to the seizure and forfeiture of the assets of convicted drug traffickers.? Finally, the NDC government ?will send a clear signal to all drug dealers and drug traffickers that it is no hurry to transfer to Ghana persons convicted of narcotic trafficking serving sentences in foreign prisons.?

That is it! No plans on reforming NACOB, customs, police, or other law enforcement. There is nothing on surveillance, education, and treatment. There are no planned budgetary allocations, nothing at all to show that this is a problem that has been seriously considered.

On protecting the people, the manifesto does marginally better by specifying some broad policy objectives. These include improving the capacity of the internal security agencies, reviving the neighborhood watch committees, strengthening the intelligence committees, providing the equipment and other logistics for an efficient police service, etc. Of course, this is another catalogue of wishes that most serious ?O? level students can regurgitate on an exam on Government. Specifics are needed on funding, personnel, milestones, etc. for a manifesto to be considered a serious document.

Conclusion

As we get ready to vote in December 2008, it is important for voters to be fully informed about the plans of the major political parties. The political parties have provided manifestoes to facilitate this process. However, these manifestoes tend to be lengthy and inaccessible to most voters. This creates a demand for summaries of these manifestoes. It is in this spirit that I offer this initial evaluation of part of the NDC manifesto. Based on my review, I find that the colorful pages of the manifesto mask some very half-baked, bad and even dangerous ideas, which reminds me of the inscription on the tro-tro that I used to ride from my Adabraka abode to the then Makola No. 1 ? don?t mind the body, mind the engine!

Source:?Asare, S. Kwaku

The Monte Carlo’s Success Story

Monte Carlo
Monte Carlo

The chief executive of Monte Carlo Grand Caf?, Mrs. Sally Kanbonaba Kleyn, has declared her intention to use her outfit to promote Ghana’s tourism industry.

She told Beatwaves that despite her huge investment in the entertainment industry she believed there was a lot to be done if stakeholders want to maintain the standard in the industry.

Speaking in an exclusive interview with Beatwaves at her office, Sally disclosed that she started from a humble beginning and with determination she had reached this far.

According to her, in 2004 she established Monte Carlo Forever Fashion off the Osu Oxford Street in Accra on her return from Europe.

Two years later she established a bar and restaurant as well as a night club, since to her, the tourism industry in Ghana was booming.

Two weeks ago she relocated her Forever Fashion House from the Osu Oxford Street to the premises of the bar and restaurant under the theme; ?Monte Carlo Under One Roof.?

In addition she opened a VIP private clubbing section within her club. This decision was to satisfy the growing demand of clientele who always visit plush joints, she said.

When asked how she came by the name Monte Carlo, she said, ?I adopted the name Monte Carlo for my bar and restaurant from Monte Carlo, a suburb of Monaco.

There is so much class attached to the name itself which made me want to bring it to Ghana.

So I named my restaurant Monte Carlo.?

Sally who is affectionately called Mama Luu (a Dutch word meaning Auntie), disclosed that she is used to living an expensive lifestyle.

?I unfortunately or fortunately developed very expensive taste for fashion. Everything to do with things around me, from furniture to clothes is authentic and expensive,? she declared.

The sight of her plush Monte Carlo Grande Caf? no doubt suggests so.

According to Sally, her taste for such posh lifestyle was an influence from a city called Monaco where she resided with her Dutch husband, Mr. Hank Kleyn and her five-year-old daughter.

Everybody in Monaco, she revealed, lives an affluent lifestyle.

Sally, who owns a Hummer H2 model, Range Rover sports 2007 model, Mercedes X-Class 500 and an Escalate, as well wears classy international designer clothes from lines as Christian Dior, Gucci, Roberto Carville and Lorenzo among others. Locally, she patronises high quality Kente and African designs from Woodin.

Sally who said she is hundred percent Ghanaian hails from Bawku in the Upper East Region.

She completed her General Certificate Examination (GCE O’Level) at the Sekondi College in 1994. She later came into contact with a man from Switzerland who traveled with her to that country.

The Monte Carlo CEO told Beatwaves that after shuttling between Ghana and Europe she decided to stay at home and find a permanent job for herself, but somewhere along the line she met her husband and they moved to Monaco, one of richest cities in the world.

Personally Sally says she thinks she is a successful business woman in

the area of show businesses. ?I have everything I want to achieve.

There is nothing I really wanted that I have not been able to get, but with business I think I am not all that successful,? she stated. She indicated that she does not enjoy her affluence alone as she also helps society.

She hinted that besides providing jobs for the unemployed in society, she gives to institutions that need support from business men and women.

?I have adopted a maternity ward at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital where I have relieved some of the mothers who were not able to pay their medical bills.

I also provide the ward with things that the babies need. I am not saying this because I want recognition, but to prove to you that I also support society.?

Sally’s greatest dislike in life is people who don’t respect others. ?I don’t like such people since I myself respect people. I am humble.

I grew up with my sister and father. I was only fortunate to marry an European. So I won’t do anything to disrespect others because I am successful in life.?

She as well told Beatwaves that beautifying was her utmost hobby.

?My hobby! My major interest is spending time at home beautifying myself.

I have to be honest with you; I like taking care of myself by making sure that every detail or every part of my body is done. I like to do my hair, my nails.

I also like speaking to my family. I don’t have any special hobbies. I will probably say my business is a hobby at the same time because I do enjoy it when I’m working,? said the 32-year-old woman.

By Francis Addo & Gorge Clifford Owusu

KOO NIMO: THE LIVING LEGEND

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Source: nigeriafilms – NigeriaFilms.com

Koo Nimo is a living legend from Ghana, playing multiple forms of traditional musics as well as new music, informed by western influences.

Koo (also known as Daniel Amponsah, from his days in London) grew up as part of the royal family of Ghana, where he learned to play the traditional red and black kete drums of the royal ensembles. By the time he was nineteen, he was teaching drumming, guitar, and brass band music in his native village of Foase.

While in London thereafter on a chemistry scholarship, he took formal instruction in guitar. After returning to Ghana, he took a position as chief laboratory technician in the Chemistry Department of the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi He remained an active musician during this time, and the head of the Musicians Union.

In 1957 he formed the Ghanaian roots ensemble Adadam Agofomma, which received considerable acclaim. Along with the kete drumming he learned in his youth, he became a virtuoso in the palmwine guitar style, a complicated pattern of two-finger picking. It is this palmwine style that he is most famous for.

His playing is influenced heavily by brass band highlife (American giants such as Charlie Christian, as well as Spanish guitar styles.

He is one of the most respected artists in current African music, though he ignores the afrobeat style.

OSIBISA: FULL ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHY

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Source: nigeriafilms – NigeriaFilms.com

Formed in London in 1969 by three Ghanaian and three Caribbean musicians, Osibisa played a central role in developing an awareness of African music among European and North American audiences in the 70s.

The Ghanaian founder members of Osibisa – Teddy Osei (saxophone), Sol Amarfio (drums) and Mac Tontoh, Teddy’s brother (trumpet) – were seasoned members of the Accra highlife scene before they moved to London to launch their attack on the world stage.

Osei and Amaflio had played in the Star Gazers, a top Ghanaian highlife band, before setting up the Comets, who scored a large West African hit with their 1958 single ‘Pete Pete’. Tontoh was also a member of the Comets, before joining the Uhuru Dance Band, one of the first outfits to bring elements of jazz into Ghanaian highlife. The other founder-members of Osibisa were Spartacus R, a Grenadian bass player, Robert Bailey (b. Trinidad; keyboards) and Wendel Richardson (b. Antigua; lead guitar), & Lasisi Amao (b. Nigeria; percussionist & tenor sax).
Teddy Osei

Teddy Osei moved to London in 1962 where he was eventually given a scholarship by the Ghanaian government to study music. In 1964, he formed Cat’s Paw, an early blueprint for Osibisa that blended highlife, rock and soul. In 1969, feeling the need for more accomplished African musicians within the line-up, he persuaded Tontoh and Amarfio to join him in London and Osibisa was born.

Osbisa in the 90’sThe venture proved to be an immediate success, with the single ‘Music for Gong Gong’ a substantial hit in 1970 (three other singles later made the British Top 10: ‘Sunshine Day’, ‘Dance the Body Music’ and ‘Coffee Song’). Osibisa’s debut album displayed music whose rock references, especially in the guitar solos, combined with vibrant African cross rhythms. The band’s true power only fully came across on stage, when African village scenarios and a mastery of rhythm and melody summoned up energy and spirit. Woyaya reached number 11 in the UK and Art Garfunkel later covered its title track.

During the late 70s they spent much of their time on world tours, playing to particularly large audiences in Japan, India, Australia and Africa. They were joined at this time, by the Ghanaian percussionist Darko Adams ‘Potato’ (b. 1932, d. 1 January 1995, Accra, Ghana).

In 1980 Osibisa performed a special concert at the Zimbabwean independence celebrations. By this time, however, Osibisa’s star was in decline, in commercial terms, in Europe and America. The band continued touring and releasing records, but to steadily diminishing audiences. Business problems followed. After initially signing to MCA Records, Osibisa had changed labels several times, ending with Bronze Records. The moves reflected their growing frustration with British business, as each label in turn tried to persuade them to adapt their music to the disco style. Osibisa were prepared to make some concessions but only up to a point.

Teddy Osei: Still blowin’, still delivering the goods!In the mid-80s, the group directed their attention to the state of the music business in Ghana, planning a studio and theatre complex, and to helping in the promotion of younger highlife artists. In 1984, Tontoh formed a London band to back three visiting Ghanaian musicians – A.B. Crentsil, Eric Agyeman and Thomas Frempong. An album, Highlife Stars, followed on Osibisa’s own Flying Elephant label.

Osibisa occasionally staged reunion concerts before Teddy Osei put together a new line-up for 1996’s’ Monsore’. Sequel Records reissued much of their past catalogue in 1999, proving how good the band were and how amazingly fresh their music still sounds today.
Contrary to popular belief, this legendary band are still in existence, still touring and still recording. Their latest release AKA KAKRA is an absolute triumph mixing their familiar rock tinged cross-rhythms with some great improvised jazz leanings.

THE HIGHLIFE ALLSTARS

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Source: nigeriafilms – NigeriaFilms.com

Some of the greatest of all Highlife artists recalling the golden era of Ghana””s Guitar Highlife and Palmwine music. Features singers Alex Konadu and Prince Osei Kofi, the Palmwine sounds of Kwadwo Tawia and brassband highlife by Kwaku Abeka

The National Liberation Council And The Busia Years, 1966-71

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Source: allghanadata

The leaders of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah immediately opened the country’s borders and its prison gates to allow the return from exile or release from preventive detention of all opponents of Nkrumah. The National Liberation Council (NLC), composed of four army officers and four police officers, assumed executive power. It appointed a cabinet of civil servants and promised to restore democratic government as quickly as possible. The ban on the formation of political parties remained in force until late 1968, but activity by individual figures began much earlier with the appointment of a succession of committees composed of civil servants and politicians as the first step in the return to civilian and representative rule.

These moves culminated in the appointment of a representative assembly to draft a constitution for the Second Republic of Ghana. Political party activity was allowed to commence with the opening of the assembly. By election time in August 1969, the first competitive nationwide political contest since 1956, five parties had been organized.

The major contenders were the Progress Party (PP), headed by Kofi A. Busia, and the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Komla A. Gbedemah. Critics associated these two leading parties with the political divisions of the early Nkrumah years. The PP found much of its support among the old opponents of Nkrumah’s CPP- -the educated middle class and traditionalists of Ashanti Region and the North. This link was strengthened by the fact that Busia had headed the NLM and its successor, the UP, before fleeing the country to oppose Nkrumah from exile. Similarly, the NAL was seen as the successor of the CPP’s right wing, which Gbedemah had headed until he was ousted by Nkrumah in 1961.

The elections demonstrated an interesting voting pattern. For example, the PP carried all the seats among the Asante and the Brong. All seats in the northern regions of the country were closely contested. In the Volta Region, the PP won some Ewe seats, while the NAL won all seats in the non-Ewe northern section. Overall, the PP gained 59 percent of the popular vote and 74 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The PP’s victories demonstrated some support among nearly all the ethnic groups. An estimated 60 percent of the electorate voted.

Immediately after the elections, Gbedemah was barred from taking his seat in the National Assembly by a Supreme Court decision involving those CPP members who had been accused of financial crimes. Gbedemah retired permanently from active participation in politics. The NAL, left without a strong leader, controlled thirty seats; in October 1970, it absorbed the members of three other minor parties in the assembly to form the Justice Party (JP) under the leadership of Joseph Appiah. Their combined strength constituted what amounted to a southern bloc with a solid constituency among most of the Ewe and the peoples of the coastal cities.

Busia, the PP leader in both parliament and the nation, became prime minister when the National Assembly met in September. An interim three-member presidential commission, composed of Major Afrifa, Police Inspector General Harlley of the NLC, and the chief of the defense staff, Major General A.K. Ocran, served in place of an elected president for the first year and a half of civilian rule. The commission dissolved itself in August 1970. Before stepping down, Afrifa criticized the constitution, particularly provisions that served more as a bar to the rise of a dictator than as a blueprint for an effective, decisive government. The electoral college chose as president Chief Justice Edward Akufo Addo, one of the leading nationalist politicians of the UGCC era and one of the judges dismissed by Nkrumah in 1964.

All attention, however, remained focused on Prime Minister Busia and his government. Much was expected of the Busia administration, because its parliamentarians were considered intellectuals and, therefore, more perceptive in their evaluations of what needed to be done. Many Ghanaians hoped that their decisions would be in the general interest of the nation, as compared with those made by the Nkrumah administration, which were judged to satisfy narrow party interests and, more important, Nkrumah’s personal agenda. The NLC had given assurances that there would be more democracy, more political maturity, and more freedom in Ghana, because the politicians allowed to run for the 1969 elections were proponents of Western democracy. In fact, these were the same individuals who had suffered under the old regime and were, therefore, thought to understand the benefits of democracy.

Two early measures initiated by the Busia government were the expulsion of large numbers of noncitizens from the country and a companion measure to limit foreign involvement in small businesses. The moves were aimed at relieving the unemployment created by the country’s precarious economic situation. The policies were popular because they forced out of the retail sector of the economy those foreigners, especially Lebanese, Asians, and Nigerians, who were perceived as unfairly monopolizing trade to the disadvantage of Ghanaians. Many other Busia moves, however, were not popular. Busia’s decision to introduce a loan program for university students, who had hitherto received free education, was challenged because it was interpreted as introducing a class system into the country’s highest institutions of learning. Some observers even saw Busia’s devaluation of the national currency and his encouragement of foreign investment in the industrial sector of the economy as conservative ideas that could undermine Ghana’s sovereignty.

The opposition Justice Party’s basic policies did not differ significantly from those of the Busia administration. Still, the party attempted to stress the importance of the central government rather than that of limited private enterprise in economic development, and it continued to emphasize programs of primary interest to the urban work force. The ruling PP emphasized the need for development in rural areas, both to slow the movement of population to the cities and to redress regional imbalance in levels of development. The JP and a growing number of PP members favored suspension of payment on some foreign debts of the Nkrumah era. This attitude grew more popular as debt payments became more difficult to meet. Both parties favored creation of a West African economic community or an economic union with the neighboring West African states.

Despite broad popular support garnered at its inception and strong foreign connections, the Busia government fell victim to an army coup within twenty-seven months. Neither ethnic nor class differences played a role in the overthrow of the PP government. The crucial causes were the country’s continuing economic difficulties, both those stemming from the high foreign debts incurred by Nkrumah and those resulting from internal problems. The PP government had inherited US$580 million in medium- and long-term debts, an amount equal to 25 percent of the gross domestic product ( GDP) of 1969. By 1971 the US$580 million had been further inflated by US$72 million in accrued interest payments and US$296 million in short-term commercial credits. Within the country, an even larger internal debt fueled inflation.

Ghana’s economy remained largely dependent upon the often difficult cultivation of and market for cocoa. Cocoa prices had always been volatile, but exports of this tropical crop normally provided about half of the country’s foreign currency earnings. Beginning in the 1960s, however, a number of factors combined to limit severely this vital source of national income. These factors included foreign competition (particularly from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire), a lack of understanding of free-market forces (by the government in setting prices paid to farmers), accusations of bureaucratic incompetence in the Cocoa Marketing Board, and the smuggling of crops into Côte d’Ivoire. As a result, Ghana’s income from cocoa exports continued to fall dramatically.

Austerity measures imposed by the Busia administration, although wise in the long run, alienated influential farmers, who until then had been PP supporters. These measures were part of Busia’s economic structural adjustment efforts to put the country on a sounder financial base. The austerity programs had been recommended by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF). The recovery measures also severely affected the middle class and the salaried work force, both of which faced wage freezes, tax increases, currency devaluations, and rising import prices. These measures precipitated protests from the Trade Union Congress. In response, the government sent the army to occupy the trade union headquarters and to block strike actions–a situation that some perceived as negating the government’s claim to be operating democratically.

The army troops and officers upon whom Busia relied for support were themselves affected, both in their personal lives and in the tightening of the defense budget, by these same austerity measures. As the leader of the anti-Busia coup declared on January 13, 1972, even those amenities enjoyed by the army during the Nkrumah regime were no longer available. Knowing that austerity had alienated the officers, the Busia government began to change the leadership of the army’s combat elements. This, however, was the last straw. Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, temporarily commanding the First Brigade around Accra, led a bloodless coup that ended the Second Republic.

The National Redemption Council Years, 1972-79

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Source: allghanadata

Despite its short existence, the Second Republic was significant in that the development problems the nation faced came clearly into focus. These included uneven distribution of investment funds and favoritism toward certain groups and regions. Furthermore, important questions about developmental priorities emerged. For example, was rural development more important than the needs of the urban population? Or, to what extent was the government to incur the cost of university education? And more important, was the public to be drawn into the debate about the nation’s future? The impact of the fall of Ghana’s Second Republic cast a shadow across the nation’s political future because no clear answers to these problems emerged.

According to one writer, the overthrow of the PP government revealed that Ghana was no longer the pace-setter in Africa’s search for workable political institutions. Both the radical left and the conservative right had failed. In opposing Nkrumah’s one- party state, Busia allegedly argued that socialist rule in Ghana had led to unemployment and poverty for many while party officials grew richer at the expense of the masses. But in justifying the one-party state, Nkrumah pointed to the weaknesses of multiparty parliamentary democracy, a system that delayed decision-making processes and, therefore, the ability to take action to foster development. The fall of both the Nkrumah and the Busia regimes seemed to have confused many with regard to the political direction the nation needed to take. In other words, in the first few years after the Nkrumah administration, Ghanaians were unable to arrive at a consensus on the type of government suited to address their national problems.

It was this situation–the inability of the PP government to satisfy diverse interest groups–that ostensibly gave Acheampong an excuse for the January 13 takeover. Acheampong’s National Redemption Council (NRC) claimed that it had to act to remove the ill effects of the currency devaluation of the previous government and thereby, at least in the short run, to improve living conditions for individual Ghanaians. Under the circumstances, the NRC was compelled to take immediate measures. Although committed to the reversal of the fiscal policies of the PP government, the NRC, by comparison, adopted policies that appeared painless and, therefore, popular. But unlike the coup leaders of the NLC, members of the NRC did not outline any plan for the return of the nation to democratic rule. Some observers accused the NRC of acting simply to rectify their own grievances. To justify their takeover, coup leaders leveled charges of corruption against Busia and his ministers. In its first years, the NRC drew support from a public pleased by the reversal of Busia’s austerity measures. The Ghanaian currency was revalued upward, and two moves were announced to lessen the burden of existing foreign debts: the repudiation of US$90 million of Nkrumah’s debts to British companies, and the unilateral rescheduling of the rest of the country’s debts for payment over fifty years. Later, the NRC nationalized all large foreign-owned companies. But these measures, while instantly popular in the streets, did nothing to solve the country’s real problems. If anything, they aggravated the problem of capital flow.

Unlike the NLC of 1966, the NRC sought to create a truly military government; hence, in October 1975, the ruling council was reorganized into the Supreme Military Council (SMC), and its membership was restricted to a few senior military officers. The intent was to consolidate the military’s hold over government administration and to address occasional disagreements, conflicts, and suspicions within the armed forces, which by now had emerged as the constituency of the military government. Little input from the civilian sector was allowed, and no offers were made to return any part of the government to civilian control during the SMC’s first five years in power. SMC members believed that the country’s problems were caused by a lack of organization, which could be remedied by applying military organization and thinking. This was the extent of the SMC philosophy. Officers were put in charge of all ministries and state enterprises; junior officers and sergeants were assigned leadership roles down to the local level in every government department and parastatal organization.

During the NRC’s early years, these administrative changes led many Ghanaians to hope that the soldiers in command would improve the efficiency of the country’s bloated bureaucracies. Acheampong’s popularity continued into 1974 as the government successfully negotiated international loan agreements and rescheduled Ghana’s debts. The government also provided price supports for basic food imports, while seeking to encourage Ghanaians to become self- reliant in agriculture and the production of raw materials. In the Operation Feed Yourself program, all Ghanians were encouraged to undertake some form of food production, with the goal of eventual food self-sufficiency for the country. The program enjoyed some initial success, but support for it gradually waned.

Whatever limited success the NRC had in these efforts, however, was overridden by other basic economic factors. Industry and transportation suffered greatly as world oil prices rose during and after 1974, and the lack of foreign exchange and credit left the country without fuel. Basic food production continued to decline even as the population grew, largely because of poor price management and urbanization. When world cocoa prices rose again in the late 1970s, Ghana was unable to take advantage of the price rise because of the low productivity of its old orchards. Moreover, because of the low prices paid to cocoa farmers, some growers along the nation’s borders smuggled their produce to Togo or Côte d’Ivoire. Disillusionment with the government grew, particularly among the educated. Accusations of personal corruption among the rulers also began to surface.

The reorganization of the NRC into the SMC in 1975 may have been part of a face-saving attempt. Shortly after that time, the government sought to stifle opposition by issuing a decree forbidding the propagation of rumors and by banning a number of independent newspapers and detaining their journalists. Also, armed soldiers broke up student demonstrations, and the government repeatedly closed the universities, which had become important centers of opposition to NRC policies.

Despite these efforts, the SMC by 1977 found itself constrained by mounting nonviolent opposition. To be sure, discussions about the nation’s political future and its relationship to the SMC had begun in earnest. Although the various opposition groups (university students, lawyers, and other organized civilian groups) called for a return to civilian constitutional rule, Acheampong and the SMC favored a union government–a mixture of elected civilian and appointed military leaders–but one in which party politics would be abolished. University students and many intellectuals criticized the union government idea, but others, such as Justice Gustav Koranteng-Addow, who chaired the seventeen-member ad hoc committee appointed by the government to work out details of the plan, defended it as the solution to the nation’s political problems. Supporters of the union government idea viewed multiparty political contests as the perpetrators of social tension and community conflict among classes, regions, and ethnic groups. Unionists argued that their plan had the potential to depoliticize public life and to allow the nation to concentrate its energies on economic problems.

A national referendum was held in March 1978 to allow the people to accept or reject the union government concept. A rejection of the union government meant a continuation of military rule. Given this choice, it was surprising that so narrow a margin voted in favor of union government. Opponents of the idea organized demonstrations against the government, arguing that the referendum vote had not been free or fair. The Acheampong government reacted by banning several organizations and by jailing as many as 300 of its opponents.

The agenda for change in the union government referendum called for the drafting of a new constitution by an SMC-appointed commission, the selection of a constituent assembly by November 1978, and general elections in June 1979. The ad hoc committee had recommended a nonparty election, an elected executive president, and a cabinet whose members would be drawn from outside a single- house National Assembly. The military council would then step down, although its members could run for office as individuals.

In July 1978, in a sudden move, the other SMC officers forced Acheampong to resign, replacing him with Lieutenant General Frederick W.K. Akuffo. The SMC apparently acted in response to continuing pressure to find a solution to the country’s economic dilemma. Inflation was estimated to be as high as 300 percent that year. There were shortages of basic commodities, and cocoa production fell to half its 1964 peak. The council was also motivated by Acheampong’s failure to dampen rising political pressure for changes. Akuffo, the new SMC chairman, promised publicly to hand over political power to a new government to be elected by July 1, 1979.

Despite Akuffo’s assurances, opposition to the SMC persisted. The call for the formation of political parties intensified. In an effort to gain support in the face of continuing strikes over economic and political issues, the Akuffo government at length announced that the formation of political parties would be allowed after January 1979. Akuffo also granted amnesty to former members of both Nkrumah’s CPP and Busia’s PP, as well as to all those convicted of subversion under Acheampong. The decree lifting the ban on party politics went into effect on January 1, 1979, as planned. The constitutional assembly that had been working on a new constitution presented an approved draft and adjourned in May. All appeared set for a new attempt at constitutional government in July, when a group of young army officers overthrew the SMC government in June 1979.