The United States Treasury Department on Wednesday, February 25, 2026, imposed sanctions on more than 30 individuals, entities and vessels accused of financing Iran’s ballistic missile programme, enabling illicit petroleum exports, and spreading Iranian drone technology to third countries, in what Washington describes as the fourth round of nonproliferation designations since the reimposition of United Nations sanctions on Iran in September 2025.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers US sanctions programmes, targeted 12 vessels and their owners or operators that it says have collectively transported hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, together with nine individuals and entities in Iran, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) involved in procuring materials for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed the action in sweeping terms. “Iran exploits financial systems to sell illicit oil, launder the proceeds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies,” Bessent said. The statement confirmed Treasury’s intent to sustain what the Trump administration calls its maximum pressure campaign, a policy reinstated through National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 shortly after President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025.
Among the 12 designated vessels, the Panama-flagged HOOT was cited for transporting hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian liquified petroleum gas to Bangladesh. The Barbados-flagged OCEAN KOI and NORTH STAR were accused of moving millions of barrels of high sulphur fuel oil and condensate. Other flagged ships include the FELICITA (Comoros), ATEELA 1 and ATEELA 2 (Iran), NIBA, DANUTA I and ALAA (Palau), LUMA (Vanuatu), and REMIZ and GAS FATE (Panama). US authorities allege the ships transported Iranian liquified petroleum gas, fuel oil, naphtha and grey ammonia to markets in East Asia, Türkiye, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
On the weapons supply side, Iran-based Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company was named as a producer of engines used in Shahed-series unmanned aerial vehicles, the Iranian-designed drones that Russia has deployed extensively in the war against Ukraine. Three Turkish firms — Utus Gumrukleme Gida Tekstil Ithalat Ihracat Dis Ticaret ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi, Arya Global Gida Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, and Altis Tekstil Makina Ticaret Limited Sirketi — were accused of acting as financial intermediaries in related transactions, suggesting that Türkiye’s commercial networks remain a significant conduit for Iranian procurement despite Ankara’s formal NATO membership obligations.
The Treasury also designated Iran-based Adak Pargas Pars Trading Company and UAE-based Mostafa Roknifard Prime Choice General Trading LLC for alleged efforts to procure sodium perchlorate, a key oxidiser in solid-fuel rocket motors, for Iranian government-linked customers including Parchin Chemical Industries, a facility the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long associated with Iran’s weapons development programme.
Perhaps the most geopolitically significant element of Wednesday’s action concerns four Iranian individuals designated for alleged ties to Qods Aviation Industries, an entity under Iran’s Ministry of Defense. According to the Treasury, two of those individuals travelled to Russia to provide technical support for Mohajer-series drones, while two others made similar trips to Venezuela. The designations confirm ongoing Iranian drone cooperation with both Moscow and Caracas at a time when Iran-linked unmanned aerial vehicles have also been reported in conflict zones across sub-Saharan Africa.
In 2025 alone, OFAC sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels and aircraft as part of this campaign. Under US sanctions rules, any property or interests in property of designated individuals or entities located in the United States or held by US persons are immediately blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions on behalf of designated persons also face the risk of losing access to correspondent banking accounts in the United States.
