The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has maintained its assessment that Ghana’s Gold for Reserves (G4R) programme incurred losses amounting to about 214 million dollars, while urging reforms to strengthen transparency, governance, and risk management under the domestic gold purchase programme operated in conjunction with the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod).
The assessment is contained in the IMF’s Staff Report for the Fifth Review of Ghana’s IMF supported programme published December 17, 2025, and, according to the Fund, remains unchanged despite controversy and pushback from Ghanaian authorities and GoldBod leadership. Addressing questions at a press briefing on Thursday, January 15, 2026, the IMF’s Director of Communications, Julie Kozack, said the Fund had already provided detailed explanations on the matter in its report.
Kozack noted that while the programme contributed to building international reserves and easing pressure on the foreign exchange market during a particularly difficult period for Ghana, it also resulted in what the IMF describes as a government related loss of about 214 million dollars. She stated that on the benefit side, the Fund sees a contribution to a buildup of international reserves and reduced pressure on the foreign exchange market during a difficult period for Ghana, while at the same time, the report quantified a quasi fiscal loss of 214 million dollars.
Kozack clarified that the term quasi fiscal reflects the fact that the loss is not formally recorded on the government’s fiscal balance sheet, but nonetheless represents a cost ultimately borne by the state. According to the IMF, the losses arose mainly from trading activities, associated fees, and exchange rate movements linked to the programme. She stated that the loss stemmed from trading activities, fees, and exchange rate movements, adding that while it is not formally captured on the government’s fiscal balance sheet, it ultimately represents a cost to the state.
Kozack said the Fund’s key recommendation is to address these weaknesses by strengthening transparency, governance, and risk management, particularly for operations connected to the GoldBod under the domestic gold purchase framework. The IMF is also recommending that such losses be reflected on the government’s budget balance sheet rather than remaining on the books of the Bank of Ghana (BoG). She emphasized that this is important to ensure that the Bank of Ghana remains well capitalized and financially sound.
The Fund stressed that bringing these losses onto the government’s balance sheet would improve accountability and provide a clearer picture of the programme’s full fiscal impact, while safeguarding the central bank’s financial position. The recommendation reflects broader IMF principles that central banks should maintain strong balance sheets independent of government fiscal operations to preserve monetary policy credibility and operational independence.
The IMF’s assessment has sparked significant debate in Ghana, with various stakeholders offering differing interpretations of the findings. The Bank of Ghana, in a statement issued on December 25, 2025, maintained that figures reported in relation to losses from gold operations in 2025 should be described as speculative. The Bank argued that since its audited financial statements, including all relevant disclosures, will be published in 2026 in accordance with statutory requirements, it would not be appropriate to give credence to preliminary figures.
The Bank of Ghana further noted that although the IMF review flagged financial risks associated with the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme, these concerns should be viewed within the broader context of the programme’s significant macroeconomic contribution. It stated that the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme has helped to boost Ghana’s international reserves, support currency stability, and enable access to large volumes of foreign exchange without incurring new debt. The operational role of GoldBod as an aggregator has been important in channeling gold based inflows from the small scale mining sector into the official market, according to the central bank’s document.
Sammy Gyamfi, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of GoldBod, has vigorously defended the programme and disputed characterizations of the 214 million dollar figure as a loss attributable to his organization. Speaking on TV3’s Key Points program on Saturday, December 27, 2025, Gyamfi clarified that the IMF’s reported figure of a 214 million dollar loss relates to accounting assessments concerning the Bank of Ghana’s Gold for Reserve programme, and not to the financial performance of GoldBod itself. He stressed that at no point did the IMF state that the Ghana Gold Board itself had incurred losses.
Gyamfi disclosed that, based on unaudited financial statements, GoldBod is expected to declare an income surplus of not less than 600 million cedis for the year 2025. He announced plans to provide a detailed response to the IMF report and related concerns starting January 5, 2026, stating that he would be responding and clarifying issues surrounding the IMF’s reported loss of 214 million dollars under the Gold for Reserves programme implemented in conjunction with GoldBod.
Dr. Adrian Alter, the IMF’s Country Representative for Ghana, provided additional context during an appearance on PM Express Business Edition on January 16, 2026. Alter explained that the assessment contained in the staff report was not intended to classify the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme as a loss making operation, but rather to highlight the operational and financial risks, particularly in relation to GoldBod dealings. The country representative noted that the numbers are still being audited and there is the likelihood that numbers could go down marginally or go up.
Alter acknowledged that the Bank of Ghana had described the IMF’s assessment as speculative because audited figures are still being prepared. However, he stressed that the Fund stands by its assessment, which was meant to highlight expected challenges and not to cast doubt on the programme. He further noted that the IMF’s intention was not to place blame on the Bank of Ghana, GoldBod, or the Ministry of Finance, but to highlight the international monetary risks associated with the programme and the need to enhance transparency around the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme.
The controversy has also drawn political attention. Eric Afful, Chairman of Parliament’s Economic and Development Committee, accused the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) of intentionally making allegations to render Ghana’s economic gains useless. He stated that the 214 million dollars the NPP is quoting is a transactional cost of GoldBod, and cannot be determined as a loss because audited financials are not yet available. However, Tweneboa Kodua Fokuo, Member of Parliament for Manso Nkwanta, has described responses by the GoldBod CEO as unfortunate and called for greater transparency.
The IMF report noted that in 2025 through end of the third quarter, losses from the artisanal and small scale doré gold transactions component of G4R have reached 214 million dollars, representing 0.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), mostly on trading losses but also on GoldBod off takers’ fees. The Fund warned that this arrangement poses risks to the Bank of Ghana’s financial position, stating plainly that the domestic gold purchase programme poses risks to the financial sustainability of the BoG.
Understanding how these losses emerged requires examining how GoldBod operates. When the Gold Board was established, its initial business model was to act as the sole buyer and exporter of gold from Ghana’s small scale mining sector. It was to be funded by a 279 million dollar revolving fund provided in the 2025 budget. That model has since changed. By the end of September 2025, GoldBod had not received the budgeted funds and now operates primarily as an intermediary.
According to the Ministry of Finance, the Board now collects funds for gold purchases conducted on behalf of clients, including the Bank of Ghana, and earns revenue through service charges and fees for assays conducted prior to export. According to the GoldBod CEO, the Board is expected to fully take over the artisanal and small scale gold trading programme from January 2026, meaning GoldBod would no longer operate as an intermediary for the Bank of Ghana.
While GoldBod itself has indeed recorded profits, those gains have come at the expense of the central bank, which has absorbed the bulk of the losses generated by the programme, according to analysis by financial experts. This structure explains why GoldBod can claim profitability while the overall programme shows losses on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet. The distinction between GoldBod’s corporate profitability and the programme’s fiscal impact represents a central point of confusion in public debate.
Finance Minister Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson announced plans in the 2026 budget to allocate the cedi equivalent of 279 million dollars as a revolving fund for GoldBod, allowing it to purchase and export at least three tonnes of gold per week from small scale miners. The government also abolished the 1.5 percent withholding tax on unprocessed gold winnings by small scale miners to incentivize formalization. These policy measures aim to increase the country’s foreign exchange reserves while formalizing a sector that has long been vulnerable to smuggling and illicit financial flows.
However, the IMF’s disclosure of substantial losses raises questions about whether additional funding will address underlying operational inefficiencies or simply expand a loss making programme. The Gold for Reserves programme was designed to build the central bank’s international reserves while supporting small scale miners. The initiative formed part of broader government efforts to mobilize domestic resources and strengthen the country’s external position without resorting to additional external borrowing.
The programme operates by having GoldBod purchase gold from artisanal and small scale miners, aggregate the metal, and facilitate its export or conversion to foreign exchange reserves. In theory, this formalization captures gold that might otherwise be smuggled out of Ghana, bringing it into official channels where it can contribute to reserves and generate tax revenue. The programme also aims to provide small scale miners with guaranteed markets and fair prices, reducing their vulnerability to exploitation by informal traders.
In practice, the implementation has proven more complex. The losses identified by the IMF stem from several factors. Trading losses occur when gold is purchased at prices higher than what it ultimately fetches in international markets after accounting for quality variations, transport costs, and market price movements between purchase and sale. Off taker fees paid to intermediaries and service providers reduce net proceeds. Exchange rate movements can create losses if gold purchases are financed in cedis but sales occur in dollars at less favorable exchange rates than anticipated.
On December 17, 2025, the IMF Executive Board completed the Fifth Review of Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement, allowing for the disbursement of 365 million dollars and bringing total disbursements since May 2023 to about 2.8 billion dollars. At that time, the Board approved a three month extension of the programme. The extension was purely technical and was aimed at allowing sufficient time to complete the Final Review of the programme, including an assessment of data for the end of 2025 and the end of the first quarter of 2026.
As Ghana approaches the scheduled completion of its IMF programme in May 2026, the performance of initiatives like GoldBod will factor into assessments of whether the country has established sustainable economic policies or whether vulnerabilities remain that could require continued international support. The IMF has emphasized that Ghana’s strong programme performance and commitment to reforms have contributed to macroeconomic stabilization, but has also stressed the importance of addressing remaining challenges including quasi fiscal activities that pose risks to fiscal sustainability.
The debate over GoldBod losses occurs against a backdrop of generally positive economic indicators. Inflation declined for eleven consecutive months from 23.8 percent to 6.3 percent through December 2025, while the Ghana cedi appreciated cumulatively by over 35 percent against the U.S. dollar during 2025, marking the first time the cedi appreciated since 2007. These achievements have been attributed partly to the Gold for Reserves programme’s contribution to foreign exchange availability.
However, the 214 million dollar loss figure documented by the IMF stands as a reminder that generating foreign exchange through commodity interventions involves substantial costs that must be weighed against the benefits of formalization and reserve accumulation. The challenge for policymakers is determining whether programme modifications can reduce losses while preserving benefits, or whether the programme’s fundamental structure requires rethinking.
The IMF’s call for stronger transparency, governance, and risk management reflects concern that without improvements, losses could continue or even accelerate as the programme expands. Specific recommendations include enhanced financial reporting that clearly distinguishes GoldBod’s corporate results from the programme’s overall fiscal impact, risk management protocols that limit exposure to price volatility and exchange rate movements, governance structures ensuring proper oversight of trading activities and fee arrangements, and consolidated accounting that brings all costs and benefits onto government balance sheets for full visibility.
Whether Ghana will implement these recommendations while maintaining the programme’s scale and ambition remains to be seen. The controversy surrounding the 214 million dollar loss assessment highlights tensions between national development priorities and international financial institution oversight, between corporate profitability and programme level fiscal impact, and between the urgency of foreign exchange mobilization and the discipline of sound public financial management.
As stakeholders await audited financial statements from both GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana, the debate continues over how to interpret the IMF’s findings and what policy adjustments are warranted. For now, the 214 million dollar figure stands as the IMF’s official assessment, maintained despite challenges from Ghanaian authorities, with the Fund recommending transparency improvements and balance sheet adjustments to address identified risks.
