Ghana’s struggle to build strong homegrown businesses stems not from weak policies or capital shortages but from a deeper national culture of mistrust that systematically undermines local entrepreneurship, according to a Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) Ghana Fellow.
Dr. Hene Aku Kwapong, former Senior Vice President of New York City Economic Development Corporation, argues this mistrust represents a manufactured condition born from decades of political instability, opaque governance and repeated destruction of domestic wealth. Over time, Ghanaians have internalized the belief that successful local companies must be corrupt, politically protected or exploiting the system.
“This mistrust did not fall from the sky. It was manufactured, slowly and painfully, by a century of institutional traumas that taught Ghanaians to assume that every successful indigenous firm must be corrupt, politically protected, or predatory. And that any state support to such a firm must be a theft from the public purse,” he stated.
Whenever government partners with local businesses, the public often assumes the worst. The consequence proves devastating as the very businesses Ghana needs for industrialization become the same ones society is conditioned to tear down, according to Dr. Kwapong’s analysis.
Dr. Kwapong contrasts Ghana’s experience with South Korea’s transformation. In 1960, South Korea was poorer, less industrialized and more devastated by war than Ghana. Yet within one generation, Korea built global giants including Samsung, Hyundai, LG, SK, Lotte and Hanjin.
These firms did not emerge from ideal market conditions. They began as small trading shops, repair centers, cosmetics producers and textile dealers, similar to modest enterprises Ghana had during the Gold Coast era. South Korea made a bold choice to trust and support its own people, backing that trust with deliberate, state-engineered support.
Under President Park Chung Hee, who came to power in 1961, Korea handpicked local businesses and pushed them into new industries. From subsidized loans to foreign exchange access, from protective tariffs to massive state contracts, the government intentionally nurtured a national capitalist class. When Park took power in 1961, South Korea’s per capita income was only 72 US dollars, yet his administration transformed the economy through export-oriented industrialization.
Under the second Five Year Plan in 1967, Park founded the Kuro Industrial Park in southwestern Seoul and created the state-owned Pohang Iron and Steel Company to provide cheap steel for the chaebols. The government rewarded companies that met targets under the Five Year Plans with loans on easy repayment terms, tax cuts, easy licensing and subsidies.
Ghana took the opposite path, according to Dr. Kwapong. Over the years, the country nurtured a culture of politicizing, criminalizing and repeatedly destroying domestic wealth. The public has internalized that success at home is suspicious unless validated abroad or partnered with foreign entities, leading businesses to seek protection by incorporating foreign partners.
Citing an example, he recounted that when local entrepreneur Joseph Siaw Agyepong’s Jospong Group was tasked with clearing abandoned vehicles, a routine urban management task, public outrage erupted immediately. Instead of asking whether the work needed doing or whether the firm could do it, the dominant question became who benefits behind the scenes.
“This is not about Jospong. It is about a society conditioned to distrust its own private sector because history has repeatedly shown corruption, political favoritism, and abuse of public contracts,” Dr. Kwapong explained.
The effect is that Ghana punishes the very businesses it needs to grow, discourages ambition and makes it nearly impossible for domestic companies to scale. When suspicion becomes culture, no local business survives long enough to become a national champion, he argues.
South Korea chose national support for its businesses, even imperfect ones, while Ghana chose national suspicion toward even competent firms. South Korea intentionally built industrial giants, but Ghana repeatedly dismantles promising local enterprises through public mistrust, political backlash and institutional inconsistency.
South Korea’s decision birthed global champions, but Ghana’s decision has left it dependent on foreign companies for jobs, manufacturing and major economic transformation, according to the analysis.
Dr. Kwapong believes Ghana stands the chance of taking South Korea’s path to economic transformation and industrialization. He lists several Ghanaian entrepreneurs including Ibrahim Mahama, Daniel McKorley, Ernest Ofori Sarpong, Akuamua Boateng, Osei Kwame Despite, Joseph Siaw Agyepong, Edmund Poku and Mike Thakwani, describing them as Ghana’s surviving capitalist class prototypes.
He admits they are not universally loved and some are controversial. Others inspire suspicion. “But they are the pieces of the chessboard Ghana actually possesses,” he stated.
These are the few individuals who have built and scaled businesses in remarkably difficult economic terrain. They have survived where many others collapsed. And they are, by experience and capacity, the closest Ghana has to local giants capable of driving industrialization, according to Dr. Kwapong.
He argues Ghana cannot industrialize without building on foundations laid by these local entrepreneurs. It cannot move forward by hoping for a perfect set of entrepreneurs. It must work with the ones it has, just as every successful nation did.
The mistrust of local businesses is not only slowing Ghana’s development, it is actively sabotaging it, Dr. Kwapong warns. Until the country learns to support, supervise and partner with its own private sector rather than suspecting it, Ghana will continue to stall where others have advanced.
Dr. Kwapong, who also serves on the board of Ecobank and founded the National Blue Ocean Strategy Institute, recently called for abolishing Ghana’s Public Procurement Authority model, arguing it has become structurally incapable of protecting the public purse. He has also advocated for comprehensive land reform and mandatory asset declaration for public officials.
His arguments reflect broader concerns about institutional design and governance structures that either enable or constrain economic development. The comparison with South Korea highlights how different national choices regarding support for domestic enterprise produce dramatically different economic outcomes over time.
Economic historians note that South Korea’s policies under Park Chung Hee spurred rapid industrialization by promoting large businesses following his seizure of power in 1961, with the First Five Year Economic Plan setting industrial policy toward new investment. The chaebols played key roles in developing new industries, markets and export production.
Ghana’s challenge involves breaking a cycle where historical experiences of corruption and political favoritism have created legitimate public skepticism that nevertheless becomes counterproductive when applied indiscriminately. Finding balance between accountability and support for domestic enterprise represents a critical governance challenge for economic transformation.
