A governance expert has proposed reforms to the institutional framework of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), recommending the separation of its regulatory responsibilities from commercial activities to align with modern extractive sector principles.
Nii Ayitey Armah, in a policy article, evaluates GoldBod’s existing structure in view of notable achievements made in 2025 and suggests reforms aimed at ensuring the sustainability of these accomplishments within a contemporary governance structure. Although GoldBod has significantly aided in boosting gold exports, enhancing foreign exchange inflows, improving traceability, and formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), its current arrangement merges regulatory responsibilities with commercial activities, he notes.
This consolidation leads to medium to long term concerns regarding conflicts of interest, diminished competition, lack of transparency, and insufficient checks and balances, according to the analysis. The article recommends a clear separation of functions whereby regulatory authority is vested in the Minerals Commission or a new independent gold regulator, while GoldBod is restructured to operate strictly as a commercial off-taker and exporter of gold.
Gold continues to be Ghana’s most vital mineral export, serving as a key source of foreign exchange, government revenue, and job opportunities. The government created GoldBod to centralize gold aggregation, enhance price realization for miners, and bolster state involvement in gold marketing and exports in response to ongoing issues such as gold smuggling, loss of revenue, inadequate traceability, and fragmentation in the ASM sector.
The current responsibilities of GoldBod include licensing market participants, enforcing compliance, purchasing gold, aggregating it, and exporting, which effectively merges regulatory oversight with commercial activities within one organization. This consolidation of roles leads to inherent conflicts of interest, as GoldBod must regulate and discipline entities in the same market where it acts as a major buyer and exporter, thereby compromising regulatory impartiality and diminishing market trust, Armah argues.
The structure poses a risk to competition, as private buyers, aggregators, refiners, and exporters may be deterred from investing or expanding in a market dominated by a state-supported entity that manages market access and enforcement while also pursuing its own business goals. Furthermore, transparency and accountability are limited because the mechanisms for pricing, off-take agreements, export volumes, and enforcement decisions are integrated.
Drawing on Ghana’s petroleum and power sub-sector governance models and international best practice from Botswana, Canada, South Africa, and Norway, the article highlights how nations that have effectively optimized long term value from extractive resources have embraced governance frameworks that distinctly differentiate policy development, regulation, and business activities.
In Botswana, government institutions are responsible for regulatory oversight of the diamond industry, while Debswana, a profit driven joint venture, functions under company law free from regulatory control. In Canada, robust independent provincial authorities manage licensing, environmental adherence, and enforcement, while private or state associated entities conduct commercial mining and trading activities solely under commercial conditions.
In Norway, governance of extractive resources is organized with distinct roles, where policy is managed by the Ministry, regulation is overseen by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, and commercial involvement is conducted by Equinor, the state-owned enterprise functioning purely as a business entity, a framework commonly viewed as a global best practice.
Ghana has implemented this governance framework in the petroleum sector, with the Petroleum Commission acting as the independent regulator and Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) functioning as the state’s commercial entity, and similarly in the power sector, where regulation is distinct from commercial activities.
The proposed policy strategy calls for the government to implement a contemporary governance model for the gold industry that distinctly differentiates regulatory supervision from commercial activities. The authority for gold regulation should either be granted to the Minerals Commission, according to its constitutional mandate, or to a newly created independent regulatory body specifically for gold, solely tasked with licensing, compliance oversight, enforcement, and traceability throughout the gold value chain.
GoldBod must be maintained and enhanced as a state-owned commercial off-taker and exporter of gold, prioritizing aggregation, value addition, transparent pricing, and international marketing, without any licensing, regulatory, or enforcement authority, the article suggests.
The proposed separation is expected to preserve and consolidate the economic gains achieved by GoldBod by preventing distortions that arise when a single institution both regulates and trades. It would eliminate conflicts of interest and restore regulatory neutrality, promote competition and private sector participation, strengthen transparency, accountability, and oversight, enhance investor confidence and international credibility, and align gold sector governance with modern extractive sector standards.
Executing the suggested policy direction will necessitate modifications to the GoldBod Act to distinctly outline regulatory and commercial responsibilities, along with transitional measures to guarantee operational continuity and safeguard recent economic advancements.
The article concludes that although GoldBod’s existing framework has successfully achieved short term economic stabilization and sectoral formalization, maintaining these benefits and setting Ghana’s gold sector up for long term prosperity demands adherence to contemporary extractive sector governance standards.
