As the Bank of Ghana (BoG) moves to convert record diaspora remittances into long-term investment through planned bond instruments, a review of how similar efforts have played out across the African continent offers both encouragement and a clear set of warnings.
The BoG’s Remit2Invest initiative, unveiled at a high-level roundtable in Virginia on April 19, aims to redirect diaspora funds into productive sectors including infrastructure, fintech, healthcare, and agribusiness, with diaspora bonds and collective investment schemes among the instruments being developed. Ghana’s remittance inflows reached $7.8 billion in 2025, now surpassing foreign direct investment (FDI) as the country’s largest source of external financing.
A research paper by banking and finance consultant Dr. Richmond Atuahene examines what the continent’s track record with diaspora bonds reveals about the conditions for success and the pitfalls to avoid, with direct implications for the BoG Governor’s strategy.
Ghana’s own first attempt, the 2007 Golden Jubilee Savings Bond, produced a modest outcome. Of a targeted GHS50 million, only 40 percent was raised, and just 6 percent came from diaspora investors. The instrument was limited to Ghanaian citizens, which shut out dual nationals, second-generation migrants, and non-citizen investors with meaningful ties to Ghana. The bond was marketed to the diaspora without genuinely opening access to it.
Ethiopia provides another cautionary case. Beginning in 2008, the country issued bonds linked to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, offering multi-currency options, lower minimum thresholds, and interest rates tied to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Despite these design improvements, the effort fell short. Governance concerns, political risk, and limited institutional trust dampened participation. The scheme was also subject to regulatory action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), resulting in a financial settlement. Thousands of investors participated, but the overall scale fell well below the project’s financing needs.
Kenya’s 2011 experience showed stronger results. A 12-year infrastructure bond with a 12 percent return achieved a 70 percent subscription rate, among the strongest on the continent at the time. Yet nationality restrictions and high minimum thresholds again limited the instrument’s reach.
Nigeria’s 2017 approach stands as the clearest success. A $300 million diaspora bond, listed in both the United Kingdom and the United States, regulated by recognised authorities, and distributed through established financial institutions, was oversubscribed at 130 percent of its target. The pricing aligned with market expectations, eligibility was broadened, and credibility was established through transparent structure. The result demonstrated that diaspora investors respond when an instrument combines emotional connection with genuine financial competitiveness.
The pattern across all four cases is consistent. Bonds that succeeded did so not on national sentiment alone but because they functioned as credible, flexible, and investor-centric financial products. According to the World Bank, Africa’s untapped diaspora capital remains vast, but releasing it requires expanding eligibility beyond strict citizenship, offering competitive and market-driven returns, ensuring instruments can be traded, and reinforcing governance and transparency.
For Ghana, the stakes are clear. Remittances already flow at scale but currently fuel consumption rather than capital formation. If the BoG’s next attempt at diaspora bonds incorporates the design lessons that Africa’s history has produced, it could mark a meaningful shift in how the country finances its development.
