The United States has approximately two months of rare earth supply remaining for defence manufacturing, a figure first reported by the South China Morning Post citing officials with direct knowledge of government holdings, placing Africa’s vast critical mineral reserves at the centre of one of the most consequential supply chain contests in modern geopolitical history.
The stockpile assessment comes as Washington had just begun airstrikes on Iran, operations that burn through munitions containing the very rare earth compounds now in critically short supply. Analysts have cautioned that the two-month figure may reflect specific materials or particular supply chain nodes rather than the entirety of United States strategic reserves, given that stockpile details are partly classified. China controls not just over 60 percent of global mining output but closer to 90 percent of refining and separation capacity, and an even higher share of the permanent magnet manufacturing that converts processed rare earths into defence-ready components.
The confrontation has been escalating since April 2025, when Beijing imposed export licensing requirements on seven heavy rare earth elements, including dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium. A partial easing secured through diplomatic pressure in July 2025 did not hold. By early 2026, China had reimposed dual-use controls and export volumes of controlled compounds fell well below historical averages.
David Merriman, research director at Project Blue Metals, told S&P Global Platts that the market outside China will face supply bottlenecks through at least 2027 as alternative sources are developed. Under China’s 15th Five-Year Plan covering 2026 to 2030, Beijing plans to strengthen development of its rare earth industry and improve export control systems governing the minerals, policies that analysts say could deepen its influence over global supply chains for defence technologies, electronics, and clean energy systems.
Washington has responded with significant financial commitments. On February 3, 2026, the White House unveiled Project Vault, a US$12 billion initiative combining US$2 billion in private capital with a US$10 billion Export-Import Bank loan to establish the first strategic critical minerals reserve for private industry. The Pentagon has also acquired a US$500 million equity stake in MP Materials, which operates the Mountain Pass mine in California, and extended it a US$150 million loan to expand heavy rare earth separation capacity. USA Rare Earth, another beneficiary of federal investment, does not expect commercial production to begin until 2028.
Into the gap, Africa has emerged with decisive geological leverage. The continent holds approximately 30 percent of the world’s proven critical mineral reserves. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) produces 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, while South Africa, Gabon, and Ghana collectively produce 60 percent of manganese. The DRC also holds at least 60 percent of global coltan reserves, and rare earth deposits have been confirmed at multiple sites across its mineral-rich eastern and central provinces.
The Trump administration has moved to formalise access through a US-Congo Strategic Partnership Agreement anchored around a minerals-for-security framework, with American officials witnessing the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Glencore and the US-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium in February 2026 for potential acquisition of Congolese mining assets. Infrastructure however remains a formidable obstacle: only 5 percent of Congolese roads are paved, and national electrification stands at 21 percent. The United States has committed US$560 million toward the Lobito rail corridor linking the mineral belt to Atlantic export terminals.
In Botswana, Canadian exploration company Tsodilo Resources announced in late February 2026 that early drilling at its Gcwihaba Metals project confirmed the presence of all 15 rare earth elements on the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) Critical Minerals List, at depths of just 20 to 50 metres below the surface. Shallow deposits significantly reduce extraction costs and accelerate the timeline to commercial production. Botswana’s government has indicated it intends to negotiate access on terms reflecting its sovereign interests, drawing on the country’s history of extracting meaningful equity stakes from foreign partners as a condition of mineral access.
South Africa’s Phalaborwa carbonatite complex, one of the world’s largest, had been expected to contribute approximately 1,900 tonnes per year of rare earth concentrate to non-Chinese supply chains. That project has encountered headwinds following the pause of United States foreign assistance in the context of bilateral tensions over South Africa’s land reform policies and its International Court of Justice case against Israel.
Analysts say Africa is becoming embedded in United States industrial and national security strategy rather than traditional development diplomacy, though the extent to which African states can shape the terms of that engagement on their own terms remains complex.
